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Sovereign Immunity - A Statutory Approach 
To A Persistent Problem 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
After nearly a decade of drafting and debate/ congressional 
legislation defining the nature and extent of sovereign immu-
nity to be accorded foreign nations in United States courts was 
passed in the closing days of the Ninety-Fourth Congress.-
The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976 (hereinafter 
FSIA) drastically alters the existing law on foreign sovereign 
immunity and has opened the way for extensive litigation in-
volving'civil plaintiffs and foreign states.3 Prior to the passage 
of the FSIA private plaintiffs were often foreclosed from as-
serting claims in contract and tort against foreign states by 
1 The literature concerning the appropriate extent of sovereign immunity to be 
accorded foreign states in the courts of the United States abounds; Jessup, Has 
the Supreme COllrt Abdicated One of Its Function8?, 40 AM. J. INT'L. LAW 168 
(1946); Panel, New Departures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 1969 PROC. OF 
THE AM. Soc. OF INT'L. L. 182; Lowenfeld, Claims against Foreign State8 - A. Pro-
posal lor Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. REV. 901 (1969).; Note, The 
Amenability of Foreign Sovereigns to Federal In Personam Juri8diction, 14 VA. 
INT'L. L.J. 487 (1974); Note, Jurisdictional Immunitie8 of Foreign State8, 23 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1225 (1974); Note, Sovereign Immunity - Proposed Statutory 
Elimination of the State Department's Role - S.566 99d Cong., 18t Se8s. (1973), 
15 HARV. J. INT'L. L. 157 (1974) Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sovereign Immunity 
Claim - The Haiti Case, 49 N.Y.U. L. HEV. 377 (1974). 
:.I Pub. L. No. 94-583, H.R. 94·1487 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975) (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (1976». The bill was originally introduced in January, 1973, 
as S.566 and H.R. 3493. 
828 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1608 (1976). 
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pleas of sovereign immunity. The plea of sovereign immunity, 
when supported by the appropriate suggestion of immunity from 
the State Department, deprived the particular state or federal 
court of its otherwise proper jurisdiction! 
A. Historical Background 
From its earliest formulation in American law, the doctrine 
of foreign sovereign immunity has been inextricably linked to 
policy considerations. The convergence of the legal and political 
was writ large in Schooner Exchange v. McFadden. IS In that 
case, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Chief 
Justice Marshall, held that vessels of a foreign state were im-
mune from suit in U.S. courts. While frequently cited as the 
earliest statement of the American law of sovereign immunity, 
the opinion's further significance is that it anticipates the whole 
range of issues presented by modern state trading enterprises 
and the extent to which immunity should be granted to states 
that are engaged in ostensibly commercial activities. Chief 
Justice Marshall's opinion expressed certain misgivings as to 
expanding the scope of immunity to other acts performed by 
sovereign states. Referring to essentially private or commer-
cial activities Marshall stated that: 
Without indicating any opinion on this question, it may 
safely be affirmed, that there is a manifest distinction be-
tween the private property of the person who happens to be 
a prince, and the military force which supports the sovereign 
power, and maintains the dignity and the independence of 
a nation. A prince, by acquiring private property in a for-
eign country, may possibly be considered as subjecting that 
property to the territorial jurisdiction; he may be considered 
as so far laying down the prince, and assuming the character 
of a private individual; but this he cannot be presumed to 
.. See Procedures for obtaining suggestions from the State Department and their 
submission by the Attorney General via the United States Attorney. Note, The BeZa-
ti07l8hip between the Executive and Judiciary: The State Department all Supreme 
Court of InternationaZ Law, 53 MINN. L. REV. 389 (1968). 
IS 11 U.S. (7 Craneh) 116 (1812), Attorney General Pinkney's argument pre-
ceding Chief Justice Marshall's opinion presents an extreme notion of the plenary 
power of the executive branch in determinations of sovereign immunity. 
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do with respect to any portion of that armed force, which 
upholds his crown, and the nation is entrusted to govern.s 
225 
Marshall's doubts notwithstanding, American cases have ex-
tended the grant of immunity from warships to other state-
owned vessels and by implication to other types of property as 
well.7 
As the doctrine of sovereign immunity developed in subse-
quent case law, foreign states seemed to enjoy an expanding 
measure of exemption from the judicial process of U.S. courts. 
Predictably, the so-called absolute theory of sovereign immu-
nity came under increasing attack from disgruntled plaintiffs 
whose otherwise valid claims were never heard on their merits 
because of a rigid view of sovereign immunity. With the pro-
liferation of transnational business enterprises in the early part 
of this century, private business interests became increasingly 
involved in what amounted to essentially commercial transac-
tions with foreign governments. Gradually, the so-called "re-
strictive theory" of sovereign immunity began to emerge, 
whereby courts would distinguish between the private and pub-
lic acts, of a foreign sovereign. Under this restrictive view, 
public acts (jure imperii) were accorded full immunity whereas 
private or commercial acts (jure gestionis) were examined on 
. the merits by a court of appropriate jurisdiction.8 
In 1952 the State Department announced by way of the Tate 
Letterll that it would abandon the theory of absolute immunity 
SIll. at 145. 
7 Oliver American Trading Co. v. Menco, 5 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924); Berizzi BroB. 
v. S. S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Compania Espanola v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 
68 (1938); Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, (1943); Republic of Mexico v. Ho1!man, 
324 U.S. 30 (1943), Oster v. Domini()n of Canada, 144 F.Supp. 946 (N.D.N.Y.), 
afl'd. 238 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1956), cert den; 353 U.S. 936 (1957); Purdy v. Argen-
tina, 333 F.2d (7th Cir. 1964) C6f't. den., 379 U.S. 962 (1965); Spaeil v. Crowe, 489 
F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1974); Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F.Supp. 1281 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
8 See W. Bishop, Intemational Law at 660-677 (3d ed. 1971). 
II The Tate Letter was a communication from the acting legal adviser of the State 
Department, Jack B. Tate to the acting Attorney General published in the Depart· 
ment of State Bulletin. 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 ('1952). See, Bishop, New Umted 
States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT'L. L. 93 (1953). 
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and adopt a less liberal view. The Department indicated that 
it would support immunity of a foreign sovereign with regard 
to public acts but not with respect to private acts. The Tate 
Letter itself, however, offered no express criteria for distin-
guishing between public and private acts in applying the sov-
ereign immunity doctrine in specific cases.10 
The unstated assumption contained in the Tate Letter was 
that once the State Department indicated its position, dictated 
in large measure by policy considerations, the courts would 
make appropriate responses in cases where private plaintiffs 
sued foreign states on essentially commercial claims. While 
executive policy could not control the courts, there had been 
considerable judicial reluctance to grant requests for immu-
nity where the State Department had declined to support the 
claim.ll In fact, there was strong authority indicating that the 
Federal Judiciary feels bound to follow the views of the Execu-
tive Branch on the grounds that it is that branch of the gov-
ernment which is charged with the conduct of foreign relations.u 
As a practical matter, the United States Supreme Court had 
reasoned that in sovereign immunity cases a judicial rejection 
of a State Department suggestion of immunity could have em-
barrassing consequences for the conduct of American foreign 
policy. It was largely this reliance by the jUdiciary on State 
Department determinations of immunity which gave rise to 
10 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984 (1952). 
11 The majority of courts before and since the Tate Letter have felt obliged to 
follow executive suggestions. The Court in Ex Parte Peru 318 U.S. 578 (1943) 
regarded an expression of State Department works as a "conclusive determination". 
In any ease, executive suggestions have been accorded substantial weight by the 
courts. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 197 F.Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1961) at/'d. 
295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961), Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1974). 
Praetice has varied, however, where either plaintiffs have not sought a suggestion 
of immunity or where it was sought and denied or no aetion was taken by the Depart-
ment. In Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 326 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1964), 
rehearing 332 F.2d 370 (1964), 360 F.2d 103, (2d Cir. 1966) the court initially 
accepted a plea of sovereign immunity by the Greek ambassador, then vacated direct-
ing further inquiry into grounds for immunity. The plea was 1inally denied on the 
ground that he State Department has not requeflted immunity. Per contra, Aerotrade 
v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F.Supp. 1281 (S.D. N.Y. 1974) in which immunity waa 
granted in the absence of a State Department suggestion of immunity. 
12 Ex Parte Peru 318 U.S. 578 (1943) ; Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1943). 
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complaints of "judicial abdication" 18 and the intense lobbying 
efforts by disgruntled plaintiffs for a change in this area of law. 
B. The F8IA and the Law of 80vereign Immunity 
While the FSIA took four years of preparation,t' it appears 
that the State Department had anticipated some statutory re-
form of the then current procedure since 1964.111 The bill, 
when originally introduced, was supported by the Departments 
of State and J ustice16 and has received continued endorsement 
from both departmentsP The central premise of the bill, "that 
decisions on claims by foreign states to sovereign immunity are 
best made by the judiciary" 18 is set out in section 1602 of the 
Act. In effect, the legislation directs the Federal District 
Courts to entertain suits initiated by private parties against 
foreign states, the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity 
notwithstanding, if the transaction giving rise to the suit is 
essentially commercial in nature18 and is carried on in the 
United States.20 However, the act further provides that im-
munity will be denied in circumstances where the transaction 
is "an act outside the territory of the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
18 Jel8up, HGI the Bupreme Courl .dbdicated one of 't& FWlatiot&.t, 40 Ax. J. 
INT'L. L. 168 (1946). l' A forerunner of FSIA was first introduced by Senators Roman Hruska and 
Hugh Scott as S.566 in January, 1973. Bee, introductory remarks of Senator 
Hruska, 119 CONGo BBo. S1297, S1298 (Jan. 26, 1973). 
111 Bee Summary of the Proceedings of the Ad Hoc Panel on Sovereign Immunit7 
of the American Society of International Law Meeting in Washington, D.C., April 8, 
1973. 
16 The bill in its original form as S.566 was introduced in the Senate on behalf 
of the Departments of State and Justice and is appended to a letter from Attomll7 
General Kleindienst and Secretary of State William P. Rogerl to the President of 
the Senate, dated Jan. 22,1973, 119 CONGo BBo. 1299 Reproduced at 12 INT'L. Lm. 
MATS. 118 (1978). 
17 H.B. Bep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d BeSI. 6-11 (1976). 
18 11'1. at 14. 
18 28 U.S.C. t 1603(d) provides a de1lnition of "commercial activit7" for the 
purpose of the statute. . 
20 28 U.S.O., t 1605 (a) (8). 
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where and that act causes a direct effect in the United States." 11 
This provision appears to extend U.S. jurisdiction to a foreign 
government's commercial activities which, while carried on in 
some other foreign state, somehow impacts upon the U.S. Just 
how expansively this notion of direct effect jurisdiction will be 
applied by the courts remains to be seen. However, the direct 
effect notion of jurisdiction has previously been utilized by 
American courts in anti-trust litigation where restrictive trade 
practices carried on abroad had a direct effect on the United 
States.22 The implications of this facet of extraterritoriality 
will be discussed below. 
Another stated purpose of the FSIA is to provide a statu-
tory scheme which "incorporates standards recognized under 
international law." 2S Regrettably, this assertion is less than 
accurate. While the drafters of the bill may have aspired to 
codifying existing international law, the fact remains that there 
is considerable disagreement as to when and to what degree 
sovereign immunity should be accorded to states engaged in 
activities having characteristics of both jure imperii and jure 
gestionis.24 While the long-term trend appears to be in the 
direction of the restrictive theory,211 just when such limited 
21Id. 
22 Bee Text at notes 126·131. 
2sHA Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Bess. 7 (1976). It might be asaumed here 
that the drafters of the bill were seeking to codify existing practice of states in the 
area of sovereign immunity - no small task. Bee the declaration of purpose in the 
beginning of the House Report, "First, the bilI would codify the so-called 'restric-
tive' principle of sovereign immunity, as presently recognized in international law." 
24 Until recently the British continued to adhere to a virtual absolute theory of 
sovereign immunity. Bee Phillipine Admiralty v. Wallem Shipping Ltd. (1976) 1 
All.E.R. 78. 
211 An early manifestation of the so-called restrictive theory is found in Mr. 
Justice Marshall's opinion in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 116 (1812), supra, fn. 6. In 1926, representatives of twenty nations, in· 
cluding all the major powers except the United States and the Soviet Union signed 
a convention limiting sovereign immunity in the area of maritime commerce. Inter· 
national Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Concerning the Immunities 
of State Ships. Translated to English, Allen, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORB 
NATIONAL COURTS, 303-308 (1933) (hereinafter the Brussels Convention). The most 
recent attempt to deal with the sovereign immunity question is the Council of 
Europe's European Convention on State Immunity, 11 INT'L. LEG. MATS 470 (1972). 
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immunity will obtain remains unclear.26 One commentator in 
discussing the restrictive theory has stated: 
According to this view the most that can be said of sover-
eign immunity is that the foreign sovereign may arrest suit 
or resist execution only in respect of governmental activity 
or property. It is usually put in the form that immunity 
covers acts jure imperii and not acts jure gestionis. At 
bottom the distinction reflects the municipal law division into 
public law and private law, but as each municipal system 
makes the division on somewhat arbitrary premises the dis-
tinction in international law may well prove to be elusive. 
There are no universally accepted canons for the character-
ization of activity. In some systems the canon is a constitu-
tional one, in others it is theoretical. In the result one system 
might regard the running of a railway as a public law func-
tion, while another may regard it as a private law one. A 
United States court held that a contract for the purchase of 
army boots was a sovereign act, an Italian held it was not. 
The problem is to decide whether the characterization is to be 
made according to the law.27 
It is precisely this lack of an internationally accepted stand-
ard of sovereign immunity which is glossed over by the state-
ment of'purpose in section 1062 of the new act.28 Moreover, there 
are profound analytical problems with the jure imperii, jure 
gestionis distinction. It has been aptly pointed out that such 
. distinctions are logically inconsistent because they involve an 
See Comment, Sover~ign Immunity from Jud'ioial Enforoement: The Impact 01 the 
European Conventio'll-on State Immunity, 12 COI.UY. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 130 (1973). 
26 See Mann, New DeveZopment8 in the Law on Sovereign Immunity, 36 MOD. L. 
REV. 18 (1973). 
27 O'Connell, INTERNATIONAL LAW 917 (2d ed. 1970). 
28 The lack of a uniform standard was underscored in THE PORTO ALEXANDRE 
(1920) p. 30. However, there were some indications that THE PORTO ALEXANDRE 
mistakenly applied the principles laid (lown in an earlier English case THE PAItLE-
MENT BELGE (1880) 5 P.D. 197. That case hail left open the questions as to whether 
, 'mere trading ships" would be accorded the SBme degree of immunity granted to 
the PaZement BeIge, a Belgian mail boat involved in a collision with a British 
vessel. For other British Cases adhering to a more liberal grant of immunity see 
RAHIMTOALA v. H. E. H. THE NIZAM OF HYDERABAD (1958) A.C. 379 and THAI-
EUROPE TAPIOCA SERVICE LTD. V. GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN (1975) 3 All E.R. 961; 
However, it appears that courts in the United Kingdom are moving toward the 
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. See TRENDTEX TRADING LTD. V. CENTRAL 
BANK OF NIGERIA (1977) 2WLR 356. 
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a priori assumption as to the proper function of governments. 
While acta jure imperiti were readily distinguishable from acta 
jure gestionis according to European laissez-faire theories of 
the nineteenth century, such distinctions appear elusive today 
in a world community which is divided into modified capitalist, 
mixed and variations on socialist economies.29 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is, as its name implies, 
inextricably bound up on the notion of sovereignty of states. 
The chief argument on behalf of the doctrine is that the prin-
ciples of independence, dignity and equality of states precludes 
courts of one state from exercising jurisdiction over a foreign 
government. To do so, it is argued, would amount to an im-
permissible exercise of imperium in disregard of the funda-
mental canons of international law. While there has been con-
siderable erosion of the principle of absolute immunity, as noted 
above, analytical problems continue with the restrictive theory 
insofar as it impinges upon the sovereignty of states. 
As already discussed, the long term trend from the 1926 
Brussels Convention to the most recent pronouncement of the 
Council of Europe on State ImmunityS° has been towards per-
mitting the courts of one state to adjudicate claims ·of aggrieved 
private parties against foreign states by applying the restric-
tive theory of immunity. But the states adhering to the re-
strictive view have tended to be developed Western States.lt 
These states tend to view the jure imperiti, jure gestionis dis-
tinction in more traditional terms. Distinctions between the 
private and public sectors are more acute in the West and 
generally public welfare programs notwithstanding govern-
ments are not viewed as acting in their public or sovereign 
capacities when engaged in any form of commercial activity. 
But even in the West numerous activities which might be con-
sidered as appropriately within the private sector - railways, 
29 Brierly, THE LAw OF NATIONS (6th ed. 1963) p. 250. See Lauterpaeht, THIC 
PROBLEM 01' JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES 01' FOREIGN STATES, 28 BR. YB. OF INT'L. 
L. 220,226 (1951). 
80 Bee note 25, supra. 
81 Ibid. 
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airlines, telephone, telegraph and utilities - are now run by the 
government in most European states. In general, the folklore of 
Benthamite private enterprise and free trade, more than any 
other factor, prevents many states, particUlarly the U.S., from 
seeing to what extent government regulation and initiative has 
preempted the field in many areas. Post-war nationalizations 
in the United Kingdom led to public ownership of many basic 
industries, including the mines. In the United States, govern-
ment owned corporations, such as the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority and Bonneville Power Commission, have been estab-
lished despite widespread prejudice against the very notion of 
public enterprise. 
In addition to socialist economies, most developing nations 
eschew the traditional view of state in economic organization. 
Recent assertions by the newer developing states, the United 
Nations Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources811 and the· New International Economic OrderD ex-
press a sharpened view of state sovereignty, one not wholly dis-
similar from the absolute sovereign immunity rationale. De-
veloping states argue that since they have permanent sover-
eignty over their natural resources, any concession contract or 
agreement with developed states or their corporations bows 
. before this broad assertion of sovereignty. Thus where a de-
veloping country contracts with a mineral extraction company 
to permit extraction of mineral resources these agreements ex-
ist in large measure against the backdrop of absolute sover-
eignty. By analogy, this situation resembles the relationship 
which existed between private litigants and foreign govern-
ments prior to the advent of the restrictive theory. Thus, while 
European states and the United States may view domestic ad-
judication of commercial or tort claims against other govern-
ments as desirable, numerous other states would perceive this 
as an intolerable interference with their sovereignty. More-
over, the developing states see the role of their central govern-
8IIU.N.G.A. Rea. 3171 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973. 
88 U.N.G.A. Rea. 3202 (S·VI) of 16 May 1974. 
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ments as sharply instrumentalist in the area of economic or-
ganization. 
Viewed another way, the U.S. and other states adopting simi-
lar notions of the appropriate relationship between government 
and commerce, have done so for reasons of policy and tradition 
unique to each country. But profound doubts arise as to whether 
the U.S. and states similarly situated ought to autointerpret 
the proper relationship between public and private sectors for 
other states in varying stages of economic and political de-
velopment. Furthermore, by calling upon U.S. domestic courts 
to give judicial force to our views to the detriment of other 
states it is quite conceivable that international claims will ensue 
on a state-to-state level. The result of all of this is an elevation 
of what the U.S. regards as mere commercial disputes to the 
level of high politics. One is left with profound doubts as to 
whether this is consistent with the United States' view of the 
role of law or the harmonization of the horizontal relationships 
among states. 
In short, international law provides little in the way of gen-
erally accepted parameters of sovereign immunity. While many 
states adhere to the restrictive view, numerous states take a con-
trary position. Section 1602 of the FSIA represents more of 
an assertion of the restrictive view of sovereign immunity, cur-
rently popular in western Europe and the U.S., rather than a 
broad consensus as to the law. This seems inconsistent with cer-
tain fundamental values that are clearly within universal concepts 
of the international legal order. Not the least of these is the 
fundamental notion of sovereign equality and the implied power 
of each state to determine its own economic organization. 
Apart from the international law considerations, there are 
several constitutional questions posed by the passage of con-
gressional legislation which impinges upon an area of executive 
power and discretion previously recognized by the Judicial 
Branch as properly within the ambit of executive authority. 
On balance, the FSIA of 1976 represents an attempt by Con-
gress to bring order to the problem of sovereign immunity. 
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This article will examine the new law as it affects previous U.S. 
law, the current practice of states regarding sovereign immu-
nity, and the potential separation of powers difficulties pre-
sented by the new bill. 
II. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT AND ITs EFFECT 
ON U.S. DOMESTIC PRACTICE 
A. The Prior Law 
The FSIA provides a detailed statutory scheme by which for-
eign states will be presumed immune from suit subject to speci-
fied exceptions. Sections 1603-1605 provide the definitional 
references for the main body of the Act. Therein Congress has 
provided a legislative standard for judicial determinations of 
when and under what circumstances immunity from suit will 
inhere in the actions of foreign states. 
In effect, Congress has gone substantially further in articu-
lating the desire of the United States to adhere to a restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity than the Department of State 
had gone in 1952. To recapitulate, the Department made it clear 
v;ia the 'Tate Letter that its policy was to decline immunity to 
friendly foreign states in suits arising out of essentially com-
mercial activity. The chief problem with the Tate Letter was 
the obvious lack of legal standards with which to distinguish 
between a sovereign's public and private acts. Moreover, the 
Tate Letter provided no clear cut indication as to when legal 
standards were to give way to policy determinations made by 
the Department of State. 
State and federal courts struggled to find some workable 
standard for judicial determinations of immunity following 
the Department of State's endorsement of the restrictive im-
munity. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria Generals4 illus-
trates many of the problems confronting the courts in their 
attempts to bring order to an area of the law marked by uncer-
tainty and inconsistency. In Victory Transport, an American 
shipping company sued an instrumentality of the Spanish Gov-
84 336 F.2d 354 (1964). 
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ernment to compel arbitration of a claim for damages allegedly 
sustained by one of plaintiff's vessels while unloading grain in 
a Spanish port.'a There, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit attempted to impose workable contours on the vagaries 
of the Tate Letter by holding that a claim of sovereign immu-
nity would not stand where the suit arose out of purely com-
mercial transaction. Speaking for the court, Judge Smith stated: 
Since the State Department's failure or refusal to suggest 
immunity is significant, we are disposed to deny a claim of 
sovereign immunity that has not been "recognized and al-
lowed" by the State Department unless it is plain that the 
activity in question falls within one of the categories of 
strictly political or public acts about which sovereigns have 
traditionally been quite sensitive. Such acts are generally 
limited to the following categories: 
(1) internal administrative acts, such as nationalization; 
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization; 
(3) acts concerning the armed forces; 
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity; and, 
( 5) public loans. 
The Comisaira General's chartering of the appellee's ship 
to transport a purchase of wheat is not a strictly public or 
political act. Indeed, it partakes far more of the character 
of a private commercial act than a public or political act. ae 
But, while the Second Circuit tried to flesh out some standard 
for distinguishing between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis, 
no readily applicable judicial standard was defined. Indeed, just 
what" Act[s] concerning the armed forces" should be entitled to 
sovereign immunity remained an unsettled question after Vic-
tory Transport.''1 
In Aerotrade Inc. v. Republic of Haiti88 a foreign govern-
mental agency purchasing military equipment, some of which 
was used for nonmilitary purposes, was held to be entitled to 
811 The charter party contained the New York Procedure Arbitration clause. When 
the Spanish government refused to arbitrate, suit was brought in the federal district 
court for the Southern District of New York to compel arbitration under the United 
States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. ~ 4 (1947). 
88 Note 34, B'Upt'CI. 
a'1Id. 
88376 F.Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
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immunity from suit, notwithstanding the fact that the Haitian 
government had not sought a suggestion of immunity from the 
State Department. Thus, while the court in Victory Transport 
purported to lay down guidelines for determining when immu-
nity should be appropriately granted, the lack of definitional 
clarity of terms like "acts concerning the armed forces" did 
not admit of a precise judicial precedent for subsequent immu-
nitycases. 
Prior to Victory Transport, other U.s. decisions dealing with 
the question of sovereign immunity displayed marked inconsist-
ency in their results. In Et Ve Balik Kurumu v. B.N.S. Int'l 
Sales Oorp.89 an agency of the Turkish government was en-
gaged in purchasing meat for the Turkish Army. The plaintiff 
in that case, an American provisions supplier alleged a breach 
in the procurement contract between itself and the Turkish pur-
chasing agents. While it was shown that the bulk of the pur-
chases were intended for the Turkish army, the court reasoned 
that the act of purchasing meat did not serve traditional pur-
poses of government and was not entitled to immunity. But, to 
illustrate the divergent views existing even within the. same 
circuit, an earlier case involving a similar fact situation, the 
purchase of shoes for a foreign army, held that such purchases 
were sovereign acts worth of immunity from suit.'o Suffice it to 
say that, in spite of numerous attempts by the judiciary to come 
to grips with the problem of separating commercial from gov-
ernmental activities, considerable uncertainty remained. 
The FSIA, on the other hand, specifically denies immunity 
where there is "a contract by a foreign government to buy 
provisions or equipment for its armed forces.,,41 This amounts. 
to a legislative reversal of the result in Aerotrade Inc. v. Repub-
lic of Haiti42 where the court had followed the reasoning in 
89 25 Mise. 2d 299, 204 N.Y.S. 3d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd. 17 App. Div. 2d 927, 
233 N.Y.S. 2d 1013 (1962). 
40 Kingdom of Romania v. Guarantee Trust Co., 250 F.341 (2d Cir.), cert. 11,611.., 
246 U.S. 633 (1918). 
41 H.R. Rep. No. 1487 94th Congo 2d Sess. 16 (1976). 
42 Note 38, 8'Upra. 
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Victory Transport 'V. Oomisaria GeneraZ" thereby dismissing 
plaintiff's complaint on the ground that "the contract upon this 
suit is based and the goods sold thereunder involved equipment 
for the armed services of Haiti. " .. 
The issue of whether government procurement contracts 
should be accorded immunity runs to the core of the debate over 
which are acts jure imperii, and which are acts jure gestionis. 
On its face, the acquisition of arms for defense programs ap-
pears to be a quintessentially sovereign act. However, section 
1603 of the act adopts the commercial nature of the transaction 
as the exclusive test of governmental liability,411 thus· cutting 
across fundamental notions of sovereignty and sovereign equal-
ity. 
In effect, the courts are bound to deny immunity to a foreign 
government in any suits involving procurement contracts re-
gardless of the extent to which such a denial might adversely 
. affect a foreign government's defense posture. Thus, if one 
can imagine a continuum of governmental interests ranging at 
one extreme from purchase of shoes for the army to a purchase 
of vital defense weaponry and components on the other, the 
U.S. District Courts are bound to entertain suit regardless of 
the potentially adverse consequences for a foreign state's vital 
interests or American foreign policy. This fact, coupled with 
the exclusion of the Executive Bran-ch from the decision-making 
process, places the judiciary in the position of being bound by 
congressional ~rective with respect to how pleas of immunity 
shall be treated while effectively depriving them of an essential 
judicial power to evaluate such cases on their merits. The Courts 
may :find themselves bound to deny pleas of sovereign immu-
nity in cases where a foreign state is exercising indisputably 
sovereign powers in acquiring military equipment simply be-
cause it involved a commercial transaction. In effect, the Fed-
eral Judiciary would be precluded from taking into account the 
views of the Department of State, previously regarded as all 
43 Note 34, supra. 
u 376 F.Supp. 1281, 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
41128 U.S.C ... 1602, 1603, 1605(a)(2). 
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but dispositive. The possible separation of powers difficulties 
posed by the FSIA will be dealt with in section three of this 
paper but are raised here to illustrate the extent to which the 
new legislation impacts upon the past practices of the courts in 
this critical area. 
B. Circumstances Under Which Immunity Will Be Denied 
The FSIA begins by creating the presumption that "a for-
eign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts 
of the United States." 48 Section 1605 of the bill depicts cer-
tain circumstances where commercial acts of foreign states will 
overcome the presumption of immunity of the preceding sec-
tion so as to establish jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts. 
Previously, no specific presumption of immunity existed, rather, 
states being sued by private plaintiffs simply pleaded sovereign 
immunity, relying on a public purpose of the transaction the-
ory, or on one of the categories set out in Victory Transport tJ. 
Commisaria General.47 However, executive suggestions of im-
munity were, for all intents and purposes, conclusive. 
One af the various exceptions to the presumptive immunity 
is where a court finds an implied or express waiver of immunity. 
With respect to explicit waivers, a foreign state may renounce 
. its immunity by treaty or by contract with a private party.4a 
Regarding implicit waivers, the section-by-section analysis pro-
vides that such waivers may be found in cases where a foreign 
state has consented to arbitration or has agreed that the law 
of a certain country should govern,4e Withdrawal of such waiv-
ers will not be effective. 110 The use of a waiver theory in the area 
of sovereign immunity is not novel. The United States Supreme 
Court has held that where a foreign state or agency itself has 
instituted suit that this amounts to an implied waiver of im-
munity at least up to the amount of any counterclaims.1I1 How-
48 28 U.S.C. I 1604. 
47 Note 34, &uFG. 
48 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 18 (1976). 
4DId. 
110 28 U.S.C. I 1605(1)~ 
111 National City Bank of New York V. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955). 
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ever, the final phrase in section 1605(1), "notwithstanding any 
withdrawal of waiver" would presumably overrule cases which 
have held that a waiver of immunity in a contract could subse-
quently be withdrawn after the cause of action arose.1I2 
The main thrust of the new act is directed toward eliminating 
pleas of sovereign immunity where states are engaged in es-
sentially commercial activities without regard to a state's con-
tention that such acts have a public purpose. 
Section 1605 (a) (2) of the FSIA elaborates the occasions 
when the commercial nature of a state's activities will over-
come the presumption of immunity. In effect, this provision 
denies immunity to foreign states in cases "in which the action 
is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United 
States. "113 This section harkens back to the definitions con-
tained in section 1603(d) and further states exceptions to state 
immunity in two additional circumstances. First, where there 
is "an act performed in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere." M An ex-
ample of such activity would be the issuing of securities in the 
United States that violates U.S. securities laws or regulations,1I1I 
where the issue itself relates to a commercial activity abroad. 
A second set of circumstances leading to a denial of immunity 
is in cases where "an act outside the territory of the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign 
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United 
States." 118 This provision further stresses the reasoning un-
derlying section 1603 (e) that is, where there are substantial 
contacts between the transaction giving rise to the cause of 
action and territory of the United States, a court may appro-
112 Bee the analysis of § 1605, H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 18 (1976). 
In Rich V. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., (E.D. Va. 1961), aff'd. per curiam 295 F.2d 24 
(4th Cir. 1961), the court, while not passing specifically on the permissibility of 
withdrawal of waiver indicated that subsequent withdrawal might be effective. That 
ease turned on the fact of executive intervention and suggestion of immunity. 
ISS 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
MId. 
1111 H.R. Rep. No. 1487 94th Congo 2d Sess. 19 (1976). 
118 Id. 
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priately exercise jurisdiction. By relying on a substantial con-
tact and direct effect rationale the act creates a rule of extra-
territorial jurisdiction to be applied by American courts in cases 
where foreign sovereigns have engaged in commercial conduct 
which impacts upon the United States. Previously, the "direct 
effect" theory of jurisdiction extended primarily to antitrust 
litigation where the actions complained of technically took place 
outside the territory of the United States.1i7 
This section of the Act poses several questions as to what 
extent foreigners acting outside of the territory of the United 
States will be subject to U.S. courts' jurisdiction to prescribe. 
Furthermore, it remains unclear as to how far removed from 
direct contact with the United States an activity must be to 
escape the sanctions of this provision. Unavoidably, there will be 
some circumstances where the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction to 
prescribe and enforce will be viewed by other states as an 
impermissible interference with their sovereignty. Even in 
the area of applying U.S. antitrust law to acts of foreigners 
abroad, the notion of extraterritorial jurisdiction has not re-
ceived widespread acceptance from other states.IiS The poten-
tial for conflict in this area, which will be discussed below,'1D is 
enormous. 
The new act also denies immunity from suit in cases where 
"rights in property taken in violation of international law" eo 
are involved. This section provides two categories where im-
munity will be denied: "where the property in question or any 
117 The section by section analysis states that "neither the term 'direct effect' nor 
the concept of 'substantial contacts' embodied in section 1603(e) is intended to 
alter the application of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, et seq., to any 
defendant." Thus, the bill does not affect the holdings in such cases as United States 
v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nav. Co., 228, U.S. 87 (1913), or Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. 
Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 404 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 
1093 (1969). For an analysis of the effect of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
Act 011 antitrust litigation, See Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State 
Defen.,es: Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 1 
(1976). 
118 See generally, H. Steiner & D. Vagts, Materials on Transnational Legal Prob-
lems (2d ed. 1976). 
119 See discussion in text accompanying notes 146 to 150. 
60 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (3). 
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property exchanged for such property is present the United 
States; or where the property in question or property exchanged 
for it is owned by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
government and that agency is engaged in essentially commer-
cial activities." 81 The section-by-section analysis indicates that 
the term "taken in violation of international law" means any 
nationalization or expropriatory taking by a foreign govern-
ment of property without payment of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation. 
This provision is consistent with American practice since the 
legislative reversal of Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino82 in 
the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistant Act of 
1964.88 In that amendment, Congress informed the courts that 
the act of state doctrine would no longer operate to preclude 
an inquiry on the merits of any claims against title to expro-
priated property which finds its way into the United States. If 
the property were taken in violation of principles of interna-
tionallaw, including the precepts of prompt, adequate and effec-
tive compensation, the courts were directed to make an on-the-
merits determination of any conflicting claims of title to the 
property at issue. 
81Id. 
82 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
88 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) : 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall 
decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to mal,e a determination 
on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a 
elaim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign 
state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a 
confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in viola-
tion of the principles of international law, including the principles of international 
law, including the principles of compensation and the other standa,rds set out in 
this subsection: Provided, that this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any 
case in which an act of foreign state is not contrary to international law or with 
respect to a claim of title or other right to property aequired pursuant to an irre-
vocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days duration issued in good faith prior 
to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with respect to 
which the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is 
required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States 
and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court. 
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Without plumbing the depths of the distinction between the 
act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity, it should be noted 
that the two concepts are not identical. Essentially, the sub-
stantive defense of sovereign immunity accords the defendant 
exemption from suit by virtue of status. The act of state doc-
trine exempts no one from suit, but rather, tells the court what 
law to apply. It concerns the limits for determining an other-
wise applicable rule of law. Although both the act of state doc-
trine and the sovereign immunity theory have been used to 
reach largely the same result, i.e., remove the acts of a foreign 
sovereign from the scrutiny of U.S. domestic courts, they should 
not be confused or used interchangeably. The act of state doc-
trine is a choice of laws theory by which a court determines 
precisely what law should be applied. If a court finds that the 
applicable law is that of the foreign state involved in the liti-
gation before it, and that law is valid within the foreign state 
further judicial inquiry ceases. Sovereign immunity, when suc-
cessfully pleaded, halts the judicial proceeding at an earlier 
stage than the act of state theory. A foreign sovereign state 
is exempt from judicial process by reason of its status alone 
no inquiry of applicable law is made. Once a satisfactory show-
ing of the defendant state's status is made, suit is dismissed. 
The distinction between the two theories is frequently over-
looked. Most recently the United States Supreme Court" in 
Alf,.ed Dunkill Ltd. v. Republic of CubaM further confounded 
the matter by holding that the act of state doctrine did not 
apply to the commercial acts of a sovereign government. The 
plurality opinion in Dunkill made frequent reference to the 
Tate Letter and numerous cases dealing with sovereign immu-
nity. 
For purposes of this paper it is enough to appreciate the 
similarity in purpose between the Hickenlooper Amendment 
and the FSIA. In the earlier enactment, Congress was impos-
ing on American courts rules of decision concerning the act 
of state doctrine and applicable principles of international law. 
M 96 S.Ot. 1854 (1976), 44 U.S.L.w. 4665 No. 73·1288. 
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This is essentially the same approach taken by Congress in the 
FSIA. Where property has been nationalized or expropriated 
without payment of compensation the defense of sovereign im-
munity will not be available. Here, as in the Hickenlooper 
Amendment, Congress has made a decision as to what is re-
quired by international law. While Congress has asserted that 
the above standards regarding compensation are demanded by 
international law, courts have, in the past, determined for them-
selves what is mandated by international law by reference to 
the cases before them.6li The constitutional implications and 
the impact of this legislative judgment on international law 
will be discussed below.88 
The remaining exceptions to immunity created by the new 
act relate to rights in immovable or gift property,8T suits in 
tort4!8 and admiralty.89 Section 1605(a) (4) "denies· immunity 
in litigation relating to rights in real estate and in inherited 
or gift property located within the United States." TO This pro-
vision is consistent with that section of the Tate Letter which 
stated that immunity would not be granted in actions relating 
to reai property, with the exception of diplomatic and consular 
property.T1 
A foreign state is also denied immunity in actions "in which 
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal 
injury or death, or damages for loss of property occurring in 
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission 
of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that for-
eign state . . . ." T2 While this provision specifies that the tort 
must have occurred within the U.S., it is not restricted to com-
mercial torts. The purpose of section 1605(a) (5) is to permit 
6li Henkin, Act of State: Sabbatino in the Court and Congress, 3 COL. J. TRANS· 
NAT'L. L. 99 (1965). 
66 See discuS8ion in text accompanying notell 208·211. 
67 28 U.S.C. 1 1605(a)(4) (1976). 
68 28 U.S.C. 1 1605 (a) (5) (1976). 
89 28 U.S.C. 1 1605 (b) (1) (1976). 
70 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d SeS8. 20 (1976). 
71 26 Dept. of State Bull. 984 (1952). 
72 28 U.S.C. 1 1605(a) (5). The language in thill paragraph closely resembles that 
which ill used in the Federal Tons Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. j 1346(b) (1948). 
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victims of a traffic accident, for example, to maintain a suit in 
tort against a foreign state.78 
This provision closely parallels existing U.S. domestic prac-
tice regarding tort claims against the United States govern-
ment. The Federal Torts Claims Act7' permits private plain-
tiffs to maintain an action against the federal government for 
allegedly tortious behavior of a government agent or employee. 
However, it should be noted that under the Federal Torts Claims 
Act the United States has consented to suits in its own courts 
and has not given a blanket consent to be sued for tortious 
conduct of its officials or agents in the courts of a foreign sov-
ereign. The federal government has created an elaborate ju-
dicial system to hear such claims against it in the Court of 
Claims.711 In addition, the U.S. has carefully excluded certain 
forms of action from the overall consent to suit. Moreover, the 
U.S. limits liability with respect to activities of military and 
naval forces and in no event does the federal government per-
mit execution of judgments. It should also be noted that with 
the exception of specific agreements such as the NATO Status of 
Forces Agreement, the United States has not waived immunity 
for the actions of its agents operating abroad. 
With respect to a foreign state's liability in tort, section 1606 
of the FSIA provides that "if the foreign state, political sub-
division, agency or instrumentality is not entitled to immunity 
from jurisdiction, liability exists as it would for private par-
ties under like circumstances." 78 The tort liability for states 
would not extend to punitive damages.77 However, it is sug-
gested that an agency of a foreign state might be compelled to 
respond in punitive damages, especially where a wrongful death 
action would lie.78 
The last exception to foreign sovereign immunity from suit 
is in the area of maritime liens. In section 1605(b) it is pro-
78 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 20 (1976). 
74 28 U.S.C. ~ 1346,1402,1504,2110,2401,2402,2411,2412,2671-2680 (1948). 
75 See W. Prosser, THE LAW OF TORTS 971-974 (4th ed. 1971). 
78 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976). 
77 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 21-22 (1976). 
78 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976). 
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vided that immunity will not be granted in any case in which 
a suit is brought to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or 
cargo of a foreign state where a lien is founded upon a com-
mercial activity.TII This provision permits suit in admiralty as 
long as the plaintiff provides notice of such suit to the agent 
of the foreign state in charge of the vessel and notice of suit is 
served in the foreign state in question pursuant to section 1608 
of the act. 
Section 1605 (b) further provides that notice of suit must be 
served on the person having possession of the vessel and cargo 
of the foreign state and that such notice replaces an arrest of 
the vessel as the means of acquiring jurisdiction.80 
C. The Impact on U.8. Domestic Practice 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The effects of sections 1604 and 1605 will be felt chiefly in the 
area of foreign state involvement in activities which can be 
characterized as commercial within the definitional provisions 
of section 1603 and the accompanying exceptions to immunity 
created by section 1605(a)(2). Simply stated, commercial ac-
tivity is viewed in statutory terms as a regular course of com-
mercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.81 
Where a court finds that a foreign state is in fact engaged in 
commercial conduct, immunity is denied under the terms of 
1605(a) (2) if that act occurs within the U.S. or "causes a 
direct effect in the United States." 82 
Serious questions arise, however, with respect to the direct 
effect notion contained in the statute. Almost any decision made 
by a foreign government which has to do with economic activ-
ities could conceivably impact upon the U.S. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that a foreign government has contracted to purchase 
goods and services from an affiliate of an American corpora-
tion incorporated outside the U.S. Assume also that the affiliate 
71128 u.s.c. § 1605(b) (1976). 
80 ld. 
81 28 U.S.C. § 160S(d) (1976). 
82 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976). 
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purchases its inventory in whole or in part from the parent 
corporation which, in turn, owns a substantial portion of the 
affiliate's stock. Does a breach of contract by the foreign gov-
ernment of a contract between that government and the affiliate, 
which was to be performed in the foreign state, give rise to a 
suit in the U.S. T This is possible under the new law. Yet, this 
remains an odd result in view of the fact that the transaction 
giving rise to the cause of action takes place in the territory 
of the foreign state and exists between the government of the 
foreign state and a corporation incorporated under the laws of 
the foreign state. 
In the area of tort liability, the FSIA makes agents of a for-
eign state liable for tortious conduct. This grant of jurisdiction 
to the Federal District Courts to entertain such claims is made 
without many of the restrictions and qualifications which the 
United States Government retains in like circumstances. More-
over, the U.S. itself, while waiving immunity from suit in 
certain circumstances under the Federal Torts Claims Act, con-
tinues to enjoy immunity from execution. It is with respect to 
execution on judgments against foreign sovereigns that the 
greatest changes in prior U.S. practice occur. 
2. COMMENCEMENT OF SUIT, ATTACHMENT AND EXECUTION: THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS AND FOREIGN STATES UNDER THE FSIA 
Prior to the FSIA most plaintiffs litigating against foreign 
sovereigns were forced to rely on attachment of the defendants' 
assets found within the U.S. to acquire in rem or quasi in rem 
jurisdiction.sa The FSIA provides a statutory scheme for serv-
ice of process upon representatives of foreign states thereby 
eliminating the need for attachment for purposes of obtaining 
jurisdiction. M 
However, the greatest change in existing U.S. practice relat-
ing to sovereign immunity is in the area of execution on judg-
ments. Prior U.S. law permitted commencement of suits and 
sa Lowenfeld, Claims against Foreign States - A Proposal for Reform of United 
States Law 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901 (1969). 
8f 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976). 
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litigation on the merits of claims against foreign states by ad-
herence to the restrictive view of immunity. As long as the 
Department of State voiced no objection on foreign policy 
grounds, courts would adjudicate the claims.811 But in no event 
was execution permitted.88 The FSIA permits attachment for 
purposes of execution and execution itself. It is in this respect 
that the act dramatically alters existing U.S. practice and poses 
the greatest potential difficulties for the Department of State 
given the fact that suggestions of immunity are specifically 
precluded by the act. 
Section 1608 provides the statutory scheme for service of 
process on foreign governments. Consistent with sections 1605 
(a) (2) and 1605(b), the instant provision provides that service 
of process upon a foreign state may be achieved by delivery 
of a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant state 
or political subdivision according to special arrangement with 
the defendant87 or according to an applicable international con-
vention on service of judicial documents.88 Section 1608 further 
provides that where service cannot be made under the above 
provisions, a copy of the summons, complaint and a notice of 
suit together with a translation of the pertinent documents into 
the official language of the state shall be dispatched by mail by 
the clerk of the district court to the head of the ministry of 
foreign affairs of the state concerned.89 
In addition, section 1608(a)(4) allows that if the above meth-
ods of service of process are not made effective within 30 days, 
the copies of the summons, complaint, and notice of suit should 
be sent to the Secretary of State. The Secretary shall then send 
the pertinent notice of suit to the particular state in question." 
811 Victory Transport v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964); Petrol 
Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Oir. 1066). 
86 Dexter & Carpenter v. Kinglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930). 
See aZso H. Steiner & D. Vagts, MATERIALS ON TIl.ANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 
(2d ed. 1976) where the authors refer to exeeution as "the ultimate denial of im-
munity." Id. at 582-87. 
87 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) (1) (1976). 
8828 U.S.C. 1 1608 (a)(2) (1976). 
89 28 U.S.C. I 1608(a) (3) (1976). 
80 28 U.s.C. I 1608(a) (4) (1976). 
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The service of process prOVISIOns affecting state agencies as 
instrumentalities are essentially the same as those for service 
upon the foreign state itself.81 
The underlying jurisdictional theory of section 1608 is con-
sonant with the developments in U.S. law in the area of per-
sonal jurisdiction.8J Taken together with section 1607, the in-
stant provision establishes a method of service of process on 
foreign sovereigns determined to have "substantial contacts" 
in the U.S. so as to make that sovereign amenable to suit in 
the Federal District Court.8B 
The simple procedure of section 1608 permits the litigant to 
surmount what had been the threshold difficulty in instituting 
and maintaining a suit against a foreign sovereign. Existing 
case law gave no clear indication as to how a foreign state 
could be served:l ' Previously, the use of all forms of service 
of process on an ambassador, consul or agent of a foreign state 
had been prohibited.811 
As discussed above, the portions of the law which admits the 
greatest change and correlative potential for controversy are 
the sections which permit execution on the property of foreign 
governments which is located in the United States. The execu-
tion provisions of the new act stand for the general proposi-
tion that property of a foreign state, as defined in section 
1603(a), is immune from attachment and execution subject to 
11128 U.S.c. I 1608(b) (1976). 
82 See Note, .dmenabiZltll of Foreign Sovereigns to Federal In Per80nam JutiBdic· 
tion, 14 VA. J. INT'L. L. 487 (1974). 
83 The notice requirement enunciated in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) 
and further elaborated in other cases is embodied in the notice proVisions of the 
FSIA. This notice provision, when taken together with the "substantial contact." 
notion, gives rise to the presumption that when service of process is made in accord-
ance with the terms of the FSIA and where a foreign government or one of its 
instrumentalities engages in commercial activities having a nexus with the United 
States, that state is deemed amenable to suit. The FSIA in this respect, follows the 
pattern of the Federal Bules of Civil Procedure 4(d) (3) and 4(e). 
94 Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciuda,d, 355 F.2d 619 (4th 
Cir. 1964); Cf. Hellenic Lines v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
95 Oster v. Dominion of Canada, 144 F.Supp. 946 (N.D.N.Y. 1956); Purdy v. 
Argentina, 33 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1964). 
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the exceptions in sections 1610 and 1611.96 The section-by-sec-
tion analysis also states that attachment for purposes of ob-
taining jurisdiction either in rem or quasi in rem is also pro-
hibited.9T 
This analysis represents a significant departure from prior 
U.S. practice which permitted arrest of vessels for purposes of 
obtaining in rem jurisdictionD8 and attachment of other assets 
of a foreign government in order to obtain quasi in rem juris-
diction.D9 This prohibition against attachment for purposes 
of securing jurisdiction is consistent with the method for service 
of process outlined in section 1608. The drafters of the new 
bill are seeking to eliminate the problems attendant to attach-
ment for purposes of securing jurisdiction. In the past, even 
when a plaintiff passed the hurdle of establishing that the 
transaction giving rise to the suit was of a commercial nature, 
the defendant could defeat plaintiff's claim by showing that 
the property itself was immune from the court's jurisdiction 
because it belonged to the government and somehow public in 
character.1oo In any event the property attached for jurisdic-
tional purposes was never retained to satisfy a judgment under 
the earlier practice.101 Given the service of process provisions 
of section 1608, plaintiffs may avoid the inherent difficulties 
96 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 26 (1976). 
9Tld. 
98 This was the traditional means of securing jurisdiction. See Berizzi Bros. v. 
S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943); Republic of Mexico v. 
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1943); Spacil V. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (1974). All these cases 
involved attempts to secure in rem jurisdiction by way of attachment of vessels of 
a foreign state. 
99 For attachment proceedings to secure quasi in rem jurisdiction see, N.Y. and 
Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F.Supp. 684 (S.D. N.Y. 1955); Weila-
man v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 221 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 469 (Sup.Ct. 
1959); Aerotrade Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F.Supp 1281 (S.D. N.Y. 1974). 
100 This is precisely what occurred in N.Y. and Cuba Mail S.S. Co. V. RepUblic of 
Korea, 132 F.Supp. 684 (S.D. N.Y. 1955). There, the Court, following a suggestion 
of the State Department held that the foreign government's property was immune 
from attachment and that the attachment of Korean bank deposits in New York 
must fail, even though the claim giving rise to the suit was commercial in nature. 
101 The Tate Letter never provided for execution on property of the sovereign in 
order to satisfy judgments, nor did the pertinent case Law. See Weilamann v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 221 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 469 (Sup.ct. 1959). 
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with attachment and secure in personam jurisdiction over a de-
fendant government by simple service of process in accordance 
with the guidelines in section 1608. 
In addition to the fact that the service of process provision 
has made it unnecessary for plaintiffs to attach a foreign gov-
ernment's property, the section analysis accompanying section 
1609 gives two additional policy reasons against attachment. 
First, by permitting attachment the entire judicial process of 
litigating claims is wholly dependent upon "the fortuitous pres-
ence of property in the jurisdiction." 102 This is counter to the 
policy reasons underlying the Hickenlooper Amendment. That 
amendment depends upon the presence of the contested prop-
erty in the U.S. in order to give effect to its stated purpose, i.e., 
preventing the U.S. from becoming a "thieves market" for 
nationalized property. loa Thus, under the Hickenlooper ration-
ale, when property which was directly subject to expropriatory 
decrees enters the United States, in rem jurisdiction is attain-
able by way of attachment and a court of appropriate jurisdic-
tion is left free to determine the respective rights of the parties 
involved. The act of state doctrine would not prevent a deter-
mination on the merits. Apparently, this hit or miss attachment 
proceeding and policy rationale underlying the Hickenlooper 
. Amendment is no longer acceptable. However, the reasoning 
and policies which militate against attachment for purposes of 
acquiring jurisdiction evidently do not apply with the same 
force when commercial property is attached for purposes of 
execution.l64 Thus, the arguments put forward in section 1608 
against attachment lose all of their force. 
The section-by-section analysis also declares that attachment 
for purpose of acquiring in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction are 
undesirable because they "can give rise to serious friction in 
United States foreign relations." lOIS This reasoning does not 
apply, however, when it comes to execution on judgments. Un-
102 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 26 (1976). 
loa H.R. Rep. No. 7750, 89th Congo 1st Sess. 578 (1965). 
104 28 U.S.C. I 1610(a)(1) (1976). 
105 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 27 (1976). 
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der section 1610 attachment for purposes of execution is per-
mitted in certain circumstances.loe It is difficult to see why at-
tachment for purposes of acquiring jurisdiction is more likely 
to give rise to friction in foreign relations than attachment for 
purposes of execution. This is a fundamental inconsistency in 
the new act which is nowhere discussed or resolved in the sec-
tion-by-section analysis. It is beyond cavil that attachment for 
the purpose of execution gives rise to far greater denigration 
of the sovereign independence of a state than would arrest for 
the sole purpose of establishing a jurisdictional basis. 
Section 1610 carves out the exceptions to the general prin-
ciples of immunity from attachment and execution in section 
1609. Attachment in aid of execution would be permitted 
where the foreign state has waived its immunity, or when the 
property is used for the commercial activity upon which the 
claim was based,lOT if the property is related to property taken 
in violation of internationallaw.108 In cases where the property 
involved was acquired by gift, inheritance or is immovable prop-
ertyl08 located within the U.S. no immunity will issue. Like-
wise, there will be no immunity where the property consists 
of contractual obligations owed to a foreign government with 
respect to liability insurance.110 Section 1610(b) applies these 
same exceptions to property owned by a state's agency or in-
strumentality.lll This provision of the act allows for attach-
ment in order to prevent removal of assets under suit from the 
jurisdiction.lu 
The analysis of section 1609's inconsistencies applies with 
equal force to the instant section of the act. While the new 
bill continues to declare a policy against attachment on the 
grounds that it amounts to too great an affront to another sov-
ereign state, this paragraph of section 1610 indicates an abid-
108 28 u.s.c. 1 1610 Bt .eq. (1976). 
lOT 28 u.s.c. 1 1610(a) (2) (1976). 
108 28 U.S.C. 1 1610 (a) (3) (1976). 
108 28 U.S.C. 1 1610 (a)(4) (1976). 
110 28 U.S.C. 1 1610(a) (5) (1976). 
11128 U.S.C. 1 1610(b) (1976). 
11128 U.S.C. 1 1610 (d) (1976). 
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ing lack of trust in a foreign government's good faith once 
that government is hailed into court by an aggrieved plaintiff. 
Following the affront and friction in foreign relations rationale 
set forth in the act, section 1610(d) seems to be adding insult 
to injury. 
This provision brings about a profound change in prior U.S. 
practice. As the drafters of the bill point out, earlier case law 
has never permitted execution on judgments even where ade-
quate jurisdictional bases were established in the first in-
stance.1l8 Likewise the adoption of the restrictive theory of sov-
ereign immunity in the Tate Letter and subsequent changes in 
State Department policy regarding quasi in rem jurisdiction did 
little to change previous policy against execution.114 
The chief case dealing with the issue of execution on the 
property of a foreign sovereign is Dexter <t Carpenter v. Kunlig 
J arnvagsstyrelsen,11fJ There an agency of the Swedish Govern-
ment brought suit for breach of contract against an American 
corporation; the corporation counterclaimed. The Swedish gov-
ernment's suit was dismissed and the lower court rendered a 
verdict,in favor of the defendant's counterclaim. In a suit to 
enforce the judgment, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit stated that: 
... consenting to suit does not give consent to seizure or 
attachment of the property of a sovereign government ... 
To so hold is not depriving our own courts of any attribute 
of jurisdiction. It is but recognizing the general interna-
tional understanding, recognized by civilized nations, that 
a sovereign's person and property ought to be held free from 
seizure or molestation at all peaceful times and under all 
circumstances.116 
With respect to execution on judgments, one of the bill's long 
time advocates has voiced grave doubts about the wisdom of 
permitting execution on judgments against foreign states: 
113 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 27 (1976). 
114 Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 221 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 469 
(Sup.Ct. 1959). 
11Ii 42 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930). 
116 Id. at 708. 
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To return briefly to the underlying rationale of the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity, a principle concern has always been 
that the acts of private litigants ought not to interfere with 
the sovereign functions of sovereign states. Civil actions are 
no longer conceived as "indignities". But the seizure of 
property - be it a ship, or a bank account, or vehicle - can 
severely disrupt governmental activity. The result may well 
be bad feelings between countries or even retaliation". 117 
It seems more than a little disingenuous to permit execution 
on judgments against foreign governments when the United 
States government is so immune.118 Thus, while other sections 
of the act purport to bring the U.S. law on sovereign immunity 
in line with the Federal Torts Claim Act119 and the general 
treatment of the U.S. government before domestic tribunals, 
this section of the FSIA which permits execution goes beyond 
the scope of the amenability to suit of the federal govern-
ment. 
Certain types of property continue to enjoy immunity from 
suit per section 1611 of the act. Under this section property 
held by international organizations,120 central bank funds and 
military property121 are immune from execution. The general 
theory behind exempting funds held for a bank's own account, 
i.e., those "used or held in connection with central banking ac-
tivities," 122 is that execution on these funds "could cause sig-
nificant foreign relations problems." 123 However, funds "used 
solely to finance the commercial entities" of the state are not 
immune.l24 
This general prohibition against execution on military prop-
erty is in keeping with current U.s. practicel211 but it is difficult 
117 Lowenfeld, Claims against Foreign States - A P"oposaZ for Reform of United 
States Law 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901 (1969). 
118 Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (11 Bow.) 19 (1846) Cf. Glidden Co. v. 
Zdanok 370 U.S. 530, 570 (1962). 
119 28 U.S.C. § 1346(d) (1964). See section 1605(a) (5) and B.R. Rep. 1487, 
94th Congo 2d Sess. 20 (1976). 
120 28 U.S.C. § I6ll(a) (1976). 
121 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (b) (1) (1976). 
122 28 U.S.C. § I611(b)(2) (1976). 
123 B.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 31 (1976). 
124 [d. 
12111d. 
1977] SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 253 
to square this provision with section 1603(d) where the section-
by-section analysis indicates that a contract for procurement 
of military goods will be considered commercial. If a foreign 
government has established a military procurement office 
in this country the activities attendant to negotiations of arms 
contracts would be considered commercial for the purposes of 
sections 1603(d) and 1605(a) (2). But if an action is com-
menced and a U.S. corporation receives a favorable judgment 
no execution on the property of the foreign government's pro-
curement office is possible. In this way, the bill seems to create 
a: right without a remedy. 
Furthermore, the bill sets forth distinctions which are sub-
ject to a variegated judicial interpretation. This fact, coupled 
with the possibility that courts in foreign states when executing 
on American military property located within their territory, us-
ing the new act as precedent and support in subsidiary diplo-
matic correspondence may not be given to making such fine 
distinctions between property which might or might not be ap-
propriately levied upon. 
3. THE IMPACT OF THE FSIA ON THE JURISDICTION OF U.S. COURTS 
The FSIA has wrought profound changes in the controlling 
U.S. law on sovereign immunity. In the first instance, the sec-
tion of the act relating to service of process128 introduces a broad 
concept of jurisdiction with respect to foreign states. If· a for-
eign state has "substantial contact" with the U.S.,127 i.e., is 
"doing business" in the United States, such activities are con-
sidered sufficient to vest U.S. courts with jurisdiction over the 
contract or tort claim at issue. Personal jurisdiction would 
attach by virtue of the commercial or allegedly tortious conduct 
itself, thus obviating the need for attachment of a foreign sov-
ereign's property to secure in rem jurisdiction. Section 1609 
is consonant with the act's service of process provisions insofar 
as it prohibits attachment for purposes of securing jurisdic-
128 28 U.S.C. § 1608 et· 8eq. (1976). 
127 As set down in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2) (1976). 
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tion,128 yet in the same breath the drafters would permit at-
tachment of property belonging to a foreign sovereign for pur-
poses of execution on a judgment.129 The obvious inconsistency 
of these provisions in nowhere adverted to in the House Re-
port130 accompanying the act as passed. 
There is enormous potential for conflict where execution on 
judgments are involved. The underlying rationale of sovereign 
immunity has been the express desire on the part of municipal 
courts to avoid affronts to the dignity of foreign states. Under 
prior law, civil suits against foreign nations were viewed as 
being a source of possible embarrassment to the .Executive 
Branch. Under the new act, the likelihood of such embarrass-
ment is increased dramatically as a result of the fact that execu-
tion on judgments against foreign states is permitted while at 
the same time the State Department is foreclosed from making 
suggestion of immunity where foreign policy considerations 
would seem to require such action. 
4. CONCLUSION. 
The main thrust of the FSIA is directed at providing a statu-
tory basis for determining when and how parties can maintain 
a lawsuit against a foreign state or one of its agencies. The 
most significant changes brought about by the new act are in 
the areas of defining precisely when immunity will attach and 
what recourse litigants have once a foreign state is denied im-
munity. The act not only permits suits against states engaged 
in commercial conduct within the meaning of sections 1603 and 
1605, but more significantly it provides for execution on judg-
ments against foreign states. 
128 28 U.S.C. ~ 1609 (1976. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 24-26 
(1976). 
129 28 U.S.C. I 1610 (1976). Another interesting aspect of eliminating q1UJ8i in 
rem attaehment is to take most of the litigation out of New York where so many 
countries have banking and eommereial assets, and shift it to the Distriet of 
Columbia where serviee may be initiated '/Jia the Department of State. See 28 
U.S.C. I 1608(e)(4) (1976). 
130 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 25-26 (1976). 
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The most troublesome aspect of the provision which permits 
suits "in which the action is based upon a commercial activity" 
is the expansive language of the jurisdictional phrases. Suits 
based on commercial acts performed by foreign states are cog-
nizable in the U.S. Federal District Courts where "an act out-
side the territory of the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act 
causes a direct effect in the United States." 181 It remains un-
clear as to what extent U.S. domestic tribunals will feel com-
pelled by the statutory language "commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere" to examine the activities of foreign 
states which take place outside the U.S. territorial jurisdiction. 
It is interesting to contemplate just how far removed from 
direct contact an act must be in order to escape this asserted 
prescriptive jurisdiction. Virtually any conduct of a foreign 
government having appurtenances of commercial or economic 
activity will fall within the ambit of the act. 
For example, would a Middle Eastern government retaining 
a U.S. consulting firm to determine the extent of Jewish owner-
ship of ,U.S. corporations for blacklisting purposes amount to 
sufficient contact to give rise to suits under U.S. anti-trust laws! 
While the potential reach of the statute is imprecise, suffice it 
to say that foreign sovereigns may be hailed into American 
courts to account for acts performed outside of the territorial 
confines of the U.S. but which have some impact upon the U.S. 
regardless of how tenuous it may be. 
Perhaps the most bothersome aspect of the new act is the 
extent to which the U.S. might expect reciprocal treatment from 
other states. To illustrate, the refusal by officials of the Export-
Import Bank to continue or to renew commercial loan agree-
ments with business organizations in other countries could pos-
sibly give rise to suits in the courts of those states. The hypo-
thetical plaintiffs in such a suit might make out a cause of action 
grounded in a theory of detrimental reliance or promissory 
estoppel. The decisions relating to the recission or termination 
181 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2) (1976), 
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of such loans and the attendant negotiations may have all been 
carried out within the United States. Yet, by applying the 
jurisdictional provisions of section 1605 of the new act recipro-
cally, courts of the state affected by the Export-Import Bank's 
actions may find sufficient jurisdictional contact so as to permit 
suit within that state. It remains unclear as to whether the 
United States would submit, without diplomatic objection, to 
suit in such cases where the transaction giving rise to the cause 
of action took place wholly within the territorial confines of the 
United States. 
The potential for reciprocity extends in equal measure to the 
FSIA's execution provisions. It should be recalled that while 
the Department of State has supported a restrictive view of 
sovereign immunity as embodied in the Tate Letter, the State 
Department has never supported the view that, absenting waiver, 
the execution on the property of a foreign state was permis-
sible.1ft 
As previously mentioned, the FSIA permits execution on 
judgments adverse to a foreign state. Should a foreign state 
apply the new U.S. view on execution reciprocally the possible 
consequences are staggering. Moreover, it remains unclear as 
to whether the State Department would stand for execution on 
U.S. government property located abroad. 
While the recent act declares that property used "in connec-
tion with a military activity and is of a military character" is 
immune from execution.l88 The House report accompanying the 
measure states that a court should look to the nature of the 
transaction and not its purpose1B4 when passing upon the issue 
of immunity. Thus, the celebrated purchase of shoes for the 
army might not give rise to a claim of sovereign immunity. 
Under this standard, were it given reciprocal effect in other 
states, a captain of an American naval vessel who purchases 
182 Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 221 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 469 
(Sup.Ct. 1959). Lowenfeld, Claims .J.gainat Foreig'" States -.J. Proposal lor Be-
form 01 U""ted States Law 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 922-923 (1969). 
188 28 U.S.C. 1611 (b) (2) (A) (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sea. 
(1976). 
184 H.R. Rep. No. 1487 94th Congo 2d Sess. 20 (1976). 
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supplies while in a foreign port and subsequently refuses to 
pay would be subject to suit, sovereign immunity notwithstand-
ing. The real question is whether the vessel itself would be sub-
ject to attachment and perhaps execution in the foreign state. 
Under the criteria of the FSIA the ship is immune from execu-
tion but it is impossible to anticipate how this section of the 
act would be interpreted and applied by states for purposes 
of according reciprocal treatment to the U.S. Ultimately, while 
execution remains an unlikely result under such circumstances, 
courts in other states cannot be expected to make the fine dis-
tinctions envisioned by the drafters of the bill. Moreover, while 
the vessel would, in all likelihood, be returned pursuant to dip-
lomatic exchanges, potential problems remain in cases where 
the exact character of the property was less clear. 
ITI. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AOT: 
SOME INTERNATIONAL LAw CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Introduction 
It might be useful at this juncture to provide a rapid survey 
of the purpose and structure of the FSIA. In the first instance, 
the drafters of the bill have expressed the view that: 
the determination by United States courts of the claims of 
foreign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such 
courts would serve the interests of justice and would protect 
the rights of both foreign states and litigants in the United 
States courts.18Ii 
The bill further purports to be a codification of prevailing in-
ternationallaw whereby: 
states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts 
insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and 
their commercial property may be levied upon for the satis-
faction of judgments rendered against them in connection 
with their commercial activities.188 
181128 U.S.O. I 1602 (1976). 
1881d. 
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Structurally, the statute begins with a presumption of sov-
ereign immunity187 and proceeds to provide exceptions to that 
immunity188 consonant with the definitional provisions of the 
act.1a9 Once it has been established that a state is not immune 
from suit in American courts, then litigation may commence 
in accordance with the act's service of process provisions.ao 
Should a court render a judgment adverse to a foreign state, 
party to the litigation, then execution on non-immune assets 
belonging to the foreign government in question is possible.141 
The implications of the new act with respect to prior U.S. 
domestic practice have been amply dealt with in the preceding 
discussion. This section of the paper examines the international 
law ramifications which are possible under the recent sovereign 
immunity legislation. Briefly stated, the potential for conflict 
with currently accepted state practice comes in three areas dealt 
with by the bill: (1) the distinction made between commercial 
and governmental activities; (2) the continued legislative ad-
herence to notions of prompt, adequate, and effective compensa-
tion; and, (3) the possibility of execution against a foreign 
government's property and the concommitant potential for re-
ciprocal treatment of U.S. property located abroad. 
B. The Impact of the FSIA on the Practice of States 
1. COMMERCIAL CONDUCT OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 
Section 1605, when coupled with the definitional provisions 
embodied in section 1603, has the net result of denying immu-
nity to states when they are engaged in essentially commercial 
acts. The act states in this regard that: 
A 'commercial activity' means either a regular course of 
commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of 
an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of 
187 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). 
188 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976). 
189 28 U.S.C. I 1603 (1976). 
140 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976). 
1'128 U.S.C. I 1610 (1976). 
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the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather 
than by reference to its purpose.1'2 
269 
One might reasonably conclude that almost any transaction is 
now viewed as without the scope of sovereign immunity, as vir-
tually all governmental activity involves commercial conduct 
in one way or another. Thus, a purchase of shoes for the army 
would no longer be accorded sovereign immunity. 
But, in attempting to define what constitutes a commercial 
and, hence, non-governmental activity, the drafters of the bill 
have demonstrated an unjustified preference for a market econ-
omy and limited governmental participation in the economic 
sector. However, this view is held almost exclusively by capi-
tal exporting states who have a specific notion of the appropri-
ate relationship between government and the private sector. To 
say the least, this view is not shared by the majority of states, 
nor is there any reason to believe that such a view will be 
adopted by the majority in the near future. 
Governments of developing states tend to assume a sharply 
instrumentalist role in economic development. Such states 
would view virtually all procurement activities, government 
joint ventures with private foreign investors, and the whole 
range of economic managerial functions as appropriately sov-
. ereign acts. In this context, there is serious doubt as to the 
relevance of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. How-
ever, proponents of the bill confidently state that: 
In the modern world when foreign state enterprises are every 
day participants in commercial activities (this bill) is ur-
gently needed legislation ... the bill would codify the so-
called "restrictive" principle of sovereign immunity, as 
presently recognized at international law. Under this prin-
ciple, the immunity of a foreign state is "restricted" to suits 
involving a foreign state's public acts (jure imperii) and 
does not extend to suits based on its commercial or private 
acts (jure gestionis) .148 
While the bill gives statutory force to the restrictive theory, it 
falls short of being a true opinio juris in the practice of states. 
142 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976). 
148 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 7 (1976). 
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Although the restrictive view of sovereign immunity has 
achieved a large measure of acceptance among commentators144 
and among most European states, there is substantial evidence 
that the restrictive view is in fact the minority position.14G 
2. PERMANENT SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: ABSOLUTE 
SOVEREIGNTY 
The notion of sovereignty propounded by 108 countries in 
the United Nations Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources146 stands in opposition to the "substantial 
contacts" 147 notion articulated in section 1602 of the FSIA. 
According to the "substantial contacts" rationale, any activity 
engaged in by a foreign state deemed to be commercial in nature 
within the meaning of section 1603 and impacting upon the 
United States will be subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal 
District Courts. 
Thus, under this analysis any suit arising out of any licensing 
or contractual agreement between a foreign government and 
an American corporation which has for its purposes a "regular 
course of commercial conduct," 148 such as a mineral extraction 
company" or state trading enterprise, would be subject to judi-
cial examination by American courts. The potential for conflict 
between the U.S. view and that of developing states is clear. 
This resolution on permanent sovereignty strongly affirmed the 
inalienable right of states to permanent sovereignty over natu-
ral resources.149 Matters were taken further by paragraph 4(e) 
of the declaration which states in pertinent part: 
144 Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictwnal Immunities of Foreign Stat('s 
28 BR. YB. OJ' INT'L. L. 220 (1951). 
1411 G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII) of Dec. 17, 1973 adopted by a vote of 108 to 1 with 
16 abstensions, reproduced in 68 AM. J. INT'L. L. 381 (1974). 
146Id. 
147 H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 17 (1976). 
148Id. at 16. 
1411 Operative paragraph 3 G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII) of Dec. 17, 1973. A separate 
vote was taken on this paragraph with the roll call vote being 86 for to 11 against. 
Not surprisingly among those voting against were the United States and Belgium, 
France, Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, all 
of whom with the exception of the United States are contacting parties to the 
European Convention of State Immunity. 
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The new international economic order should be founded 
on full respect for the following principles: ... (a) full 
permanent sovereignty of every state over its natural re-
sources and all economic activities ... No state may be sub-
jected to economic, political or any other type of coercion 
to prevent the free and full exercise of this inalienable 
right ... 1110 
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It can be argued with some force that denying immunity to a 
state being sued for breach of a mineral licensing agreement 
in a U.S. court might be viewed in terms of the above resolu-
tion as a type of impermissible coercion. 
Under the old theory of absolute immunity, a forum state's 
chief concern was with avoiding an affront to the dignity of 
foreign states and for the concept of sovereign equality. Under 
the Permanent Sovereignty theory, considerations of sovereign 
equality are coupled with an overwhelming concern for a state's 
territorial sovereignty over its natural wealth. Pursuing this 
analysis one step further it might be argued that the absolute 
theory of sovereign immunity is revived in the theory of Per-
manent Sovereignty. While General Assembly resolutions are 
not binding upon states in a positivist sense, they are evidence 
of a consensus among states. As such, they must be reckoned 
with by any state which purports to codify and adhere to exist-
. ing international practice. 
As discussed above, while distinctions between commercial 
transactions as set forth in 1603(d) and traditionally sovereign 
acts are readily ascertainable within a free market economy, the 
contours of such distinctions become less apparent as soon as 
the analysis is applied to mixed or socialist economies. The 
fact that numerous governments view differently their relation-
ship with the economic life of their respective states complicates 
the mode of inquiry into the existence of generally accepted 
principles of international law. This great diversity of views 
concerning the extent of sovereign immunity has been amply 
noted by commentators, and one might reasonably conclude from 
an examination of the literature that no true consensus exists. 
II101d. at paragraph 4(e). 
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C. The FSIA and the Problem of Foreign Nationalisatiou 
The FSa denies immunity in cases arising out of foreign 
expropriations where the expropriating state has paid no com-
pensation. The act states that no immunity will attach in suits 
"in which rights in property taken in violation of international 
law are in issue." 1111 The accompanying section analysis fur-
ther provides that : 
the term 'taken in violation of international law' would in-
clude the nationalization or expropriation of property with-
out payment of prompt adequate and eft!ective compensation 
required by internationallaw.1111 
Not unlike its action in the Hickenlooper Amendment, Congress 
is presenting in the FSa its view of international law, a dis-
tinctly Western view which is borne out neither by the practice 
of other states nor, for that matter, by past and present U.S. 
practice. 
As early as 1933 the United States accepted the validity of a 
foreign expropriation in the Litvinov Assignments. As a con-
dition precedent to the recognition of the Soviet Union in the 
1930's, the U.S. demanded some resolution of the nagging prob-
lem of unsatisfied American claimants who had lost property 
as a result of Russian nationalization decrees in the wake of 
the 1917 Revolution. As a result of protracted negotiations, the 
U.S. received via the Litvinov Assignments whatever rights 
were acquired by the Soviet government as a result of the ex-
propriation of the property held by Russian corporations. 
In U.S. 11. Pink,1118 the appellee had challenged the validity of 
the Litvinov Assignments on the ground that the nationaliza-
tions by the Soviet government were void ab initio, and as such 
the United States government received no rights to the property 
at issue. 
In upholding the validity of the Assignments, Mr. Justice 
Douglas reasoned that: 
111128 U.B.C. I 1605(a)(3) (1976). 
111 H.B. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Congo 2d Be •• 19 (1976). 
1118 315 u.s. 208 (1941). 
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the right to the funds or property in question became vested 
in the Soviet Government as the successor to the First Rus-
sian Insurance Co.; that this right has passed to the United 
States under the Litvinov Assignment; and that the United 
States is entitled to the property as against the corpora-
tion and the foreign creditors.11l4 
263 
First the State Department and then the Supreme Court recog-
nized, at least by intimation, the validity of the Soviet govern-
ment's actions. 
Furthermore, on a subsequent occasion the Supreme Court 
reasoned further that there is, in fact, no legally mandated 
international standard with respect to the duty of states to give 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. Writing for the 
court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,lIirl Mr. Justice 
Harlan noted: 
There are few if any issues in international law today on 
which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a 
state's power to expropriate the property of aliens ... Cer-
tain representatives of the newly independent and under-
developed countries have questioned whether rules of state 
responsibility toward aliens can bind nations that have not 
consented to them and it is argued that the traditionally 
articulated standards governing expropriation of property 
reflect 'imperialist' interest and are inappropriate to the 
circumstances of emergent states .... When we consider 
the prospect of the courts characterizing foreign expropria-
tions, however justifiably, as invalid under international law 
and ineffective to pass title, the wisdom of the precedents 
is confirmed. IllS 
The lack of a consensus among states was not lost on the 
Court in the most recent case before it dealing with foreign 
expropriations. In Dunkill v. RepUblic of Cuba,lGT Mr. Justice 
White's plurality opinion held that the act of state doctrine did 
not apply to a state's commercial activities, but in the same 
opinion the Court adverted to the absence of consensus in the 
area of expropriations: 
11l4Id. at 234. 
11111 376 U.S. 298 (1964). 
1116Id. at 430. 
1117 96 S.Ct. 1854 (1976). 
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There may be little codification or consensus as to the rules 
of international law concerning exercise of governmental. 
powers, including military powers and expropriations, with-
in a sovereign state's borders affecting the property of per-
sons or aliens.UB 
Moreover, Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the four dissenters 
in the same case, echoed the rationale underlying the Court's 
decision in the earlier 8abbatino case, stating: 
The applicability of the act of state doctrine in these cir-
cumstances is controlled by 8abbatino itself. As the Court 
there noted, "there are few if any issues in international 
law today on which opinion Seems to be so divided as the 
limitations on a state's power to expropriate the property of 
aliens". Indeed, the absence of any suggestion that Cuba's 
intervention program was discriminatory against United 
States citizens renders the lack of consensus as to applicable 
principles of law even more apparent here than in· Sabba-
tino.lle 
It is apparent from the dicta in both Banco Nacional de Cuba 'V. 
8abbatino and Dunkill fl. Republic of Cuba that the Supreme 
Court has yet to find a generally accepted standard with respect 
to foreign nationalizations. 
As a practical matter, assertions that international law re-
quires prompt, adequate and effective compensation wear thin 
when compared to the record of past international settlements 
of claims. In fact, both expropriating and complaining nations 
have displayed a marked inconsistency between their stated 
positions and their actions. 
·The United States, notwithstanding vociferous objections to 
nationalizations without prompt, adequate and effective com-
pensation, has been given to accepting half a loaf when it comes 
to settlement of the claims of U.S. nationals. The ability for 
compromise is also present on the side of nationalizing states. 
The case of the U.S. - Peru Agreement on Compensation for 
Expropriated Properties of U.S. N ationalsl80 amply demon-
strates the fact that neither of the parties in a dispute over 
11181d. at 1870. 
1118 1 d. at 1881. 
180 13 In'L. LEG. MATS, 392 (197'). 
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expropriation practices what it preaches. Contrary to its public 
pronouncements, Peru, a nationalizing state and supporter of 
the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resourcesl111 resolu-
tions gave over some $76 million in satisfaction of U.S. claims. 
Likewise, the U.S. accepted this amount which was considerably 
less than originally demanded. One is left with the distinct 
impression that not only is there no prevailing state practice 
or custom within the meaning of section 38(1) (b) of the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, but in practice states dis-
regard their own stated views with respect to the problem of 
expropriation. 
Given the wide spectrum of views, there is serious question 
as to whether the American legislative response to the immu-
nity problem represents any meaningful addition to the custom 
and usage of states. The chief conceptual problem with the 
FSIA, respecting international law, is that it is an attempt to 
impose by way of U.S. domestic legislation artificial order in 
an area of law where little order is to be found. 
D. ExeC1J,tion on Foreign GOfJernment Property and Interna-
tional Practice 
As indicated above, 1112 the execution provision of the FSIA 
-could have profound effect upon U.S. relations with other states. 
While there continues to be considerable disagreement among 
states with respect to the appropriate standards for granting 
or denying a state immunity from suit, execution on judgments 
runs to the nerves of the concept of sovereign equality. In the 
past, the prevailing practice of states has been to prohibit execu-
tion on judgments against friendly foreign states.l118 
The European Convention on State Immunity leaves up to 
the contracting state the effect it shall give to a judgment ren-
dered against it in the court of another state.1M Furthermore 
article 21 states: 
1111 U.N.G.A. Res. 3171 (XXVIII) Dec. 17, 1973. 
1112 Bee discussion in text at in. 105 to 116. 
1118 Bee discussion in teXt at fn. 124 to 127. 
1M 11 INT'L. LEG. MATS, 472, 474 (1972). 
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Where a judgment has been given against Contracting State 
and that state does not give effect thereto, the party which 
seeks to invoke the judgment shall be entitled to have deter-
mined by the competent court of that State the question 
whether effect should be given to the judgment in accordance 
with Article 20. Proceedings may also be brought before this 
court by the State against which judgment has been given, if 
its law so permits.1811 
The European Convention, which gives the force of treaty to 
the restrictive theory, stops short of permitting the court of 
the forum to give full effect to its judgment. The convention, 
unlike the U.S. act, derives its force at international law from 
the fact that the contracting parties have explicitly consented 
to be subject to civil suits in the courts of other contracting 
states. Yet with respect to execution, the European community 
thought it wiser to reserve in themselves the power to deter-
mine what effect should be given to judgments against them in 
the courts of other contracting states. It should be remembered, 
however, that the European Convention is a multilateral agree-
ment binding on only those states which are party to it. 
By permitting execution on property owned by a foreign 
government, the U.S. is departing from the prevailing prac-
tice of states. It is, likewise, SUbjecting itself to reciprocal treat-
ment from states whose jurisprudence leaves little room for 
the :fine distinctions envisioned by section 1611 (b). The fact 
that the executive branch is foreclosed from making suggestions 
of immunity from suit and execution merely compounds the 
problem. While FSIA will allow many deserving plaintiffs to 
recover in actions previously denied by immunity from suit, the 
price paid for such apparent equity may prove unacceptably 
high. 
E. Conclusiotl 
While there are several obvious problems with the FSIA 
insofar as it purports to codify prevailing international state 
1811ld. 
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practice and custom, the greatest potential for conflict resides 
in the Act's execution provisions. Formerly, the United States 
secure in the knowledge that, regardless of adverse judgments 
of foreign states there would be no execution against U.S. prop-
erty located abroad. The FSIA has stripped away this funda-
mental protection and right of sovereignty. The result in inter-
national law is that the U.S. becomes bound by its own practice 
and autointerpretation in subsequent diplomatic correspondence 
relating to judgments and execution against American-owned 
property located abroad. 
Furthermore, the U.S. as claimant before an international 
tribunal or arbitral body will be placed in the unfortunate 
position of claiming a return of property abroad already seized, 
rather than as the respondent refusing to pay up following the 
entry of a judgment against it. Thus, where prior practice 
allowed for flexibility in responding to claims presented in for-
eign courts against the United States government, such flexi-
bility is circumscribed by the new law. 
One last point might be made at this juncture, the chief 
supposed benefit of the new bill is that it gives private litigants 
their day in court to present claims against foreign govern-
ments. This raises an additional question as to why American 
. business should receive the added protection, in otherwise risky 
business ventures, of being able to bring suit in U.S. municipal 
courts for acts carried out elsewhere. Apparently, the State 
Department is comfortable with a tradeoff of flexibility for the 
perceived advantages of litigation of claims against foreign gov-
ernments on a case-by-case basis. .A further question arises 
with respect to the future lump sum settlements and diplomatic 
resolution of outstanding disputes between U.S. businesses lo-
cated abroad and foreign governments. This loss of flexibility 
in the conduct of our foreign relations is, however, the price 
to be paid for the effective underwriting of the commercial en-
terprise of U.S. business abroad. 
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IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE FOREIGN 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT 
A. The Executive Branch, Oongress and Foreign Affairs 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide 
either a survey of the literature 166 on the topic of presiden-
tial powers and foreign policy or to engage in an exegesis of 
the numerous pronouncements of the founders on the subject, 
a critical analysis of the separation of powers issues raised 
by the passage of the FSIA is unavoidable. Therefore, the 
discussion of the constitutional problems posed by the FSIA 
will be confined to some of the several theories of executive 
power in the field of foreign relations, to an analysis of the 
major cases dealing with presidential authority and sovereign 
immunity, and to those infrequent instances where the Su-
preme Court has been compelled to pass upon the constitu-
tionality of acts of Congress in the foreign relations area. 
The potential constitutional questions which exist following 
the passage of the FSIA arise in most part from the fact that 
one of its express purposes is the exclusion of the State De-
partment from the process of deciding when foreign nations 
will be accorded immunity from suit.167 To recapitulate, the 
past practice of U.S. courts in cases involving claims of sov-
ereign immunity had been to give substantial weight to ex-
ecutive suggestions in deciding when immunity is warranted 
under the circumstances of each case. Where the acts giving 
rise to the suit are essentially commercial, that is, coming 
within the meaning of sections 1603 and 1605 of the new bill, 
the courts are free to adjudicate the merits of the case. At 
no time during pleadings will the courts inquire into the 
166 See e.g., Berger, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH, (1974), 
Henkin, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, (1972); Note, The Relationship 
between the Ezecutive and the Judiciary; the State Department as Supreme Court 
of International Law, 53 MINN. L. REV. 389 (1968), Rubin, A Wholesome Discre· 
tion, 20 N.Y.L. FORUM 569 (1975), Henkin, "A More Effective System" for Foreigft 
Relations: The Constitutional Framework 61 VA. L. REV. (1976). 
167 Bee H.R. 94·1487, Statement of Purpose p. 7. 
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position taken by the Executive Department regarding the 
particular case before the courts. Although the former State 
Department procedure has been roundly criticized/68 there is 
considerable authority- supporting the view that suggestions 
of immunity are within the ambit of executive power. 
2. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN 
STATES 
It is well established that the executive department has the 
exclusive power to recognize governments, states and the exist-
ence of a state of belligerency.l89 It has been suggested that 
the power to recognize states is derived from Article II sec. 2 
of the Constitution where it is provided that the President 
shall exercise the function of receiving ambassadors and other 
public ministers,11o In The Prize Cases1'11 the United States 
Supreme Court gave explicit endorsement to the idea of ex-
clusive executive power to recognize the existence of a state 
of belligerency. Those cases involved the possible extent of 
Great Britain's neutral obligations during the American Civil 
War. ,The chief dispute was whether President Lincoln's 
blockade of the parts held by the Confederacy could justify 
British recognition of a state of belligerency between the Fed-
. eral and Confederate forces. With respect to the President's 
authority in this area the court reasoned: 
Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Comman-
der-in-Chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with 
such armed hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarm-
ing proportions as will compel him to accord to them the 
character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by kim, 
and this Court must be governed by the decisions and acts 
168 Jessup, Has the Supreme Court .Lt.bdicated One of It, FUfl,trtion,', 40 
AM. J. INT'L. LAW, 168 (1946); Panel, New Departures in the Law of Sovereign 
Immunity, 1969 PROC. OJ'THE AM. Soc. OJ' INT'L. L., 182 Note, Sovereign Immunity 
- Proposed Statutory Elimination of the State Department', BoJe- S.566 93rd 
Cong., lat Sess. (1973),15 HARv. J. INT'L. L., 157 (1974). 
169 Henkin, THE CONSTlTUTlON AND FOREIGN AFFAms (1972). 
170Id. at 67·69. 
171 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
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of the political department of the Government to which this 
power was entrusted. 1ft 
A more recent case demonstrates the degree to which the 
courts accept executive prerogative with respect to the recog-
nition of foreign states and governments. In K 'Unstsamml'Ungen 
Z'U Weimar v. Elic%n,118 a case involving art treasures re-
moved from Germany at the end of World War II, the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to allow represen-
tatives of the German Democratic Republic to intervene in 
the suit on the grounds that the State Department refused to 
recognize the G.D.R. 
One commentator has stated unequivocally that the power 
to recognize foreign states resides exclusively in the President. 
For many years now, Congress has not seriously doubted 
either that the President is the sole organ of communication 
with foreign governments. Congress may not give or re-
ceive communications on behalf of the United States, or ne-
gotiate with foreign governments, or "conduct foreign re-
lations" . . . it [Congress] cannot itself (or eifectively direct 
the President to) recognize foreign states or governments, 
or establish or regulate or break relations with them, or 
terminate treaties, or proclaim "doctrines", or determine 
present and future policies or attitudes of the United States, 
though it may express its "sense" and request or exhort 
the President.176 
Thus, the President is constitutionally mandated or, by tra-
ditional deference, is vested with the authority to recognize 
governments. It is but a short step to presumption that the 
executive might also exercise policy discretion in determining 
the reach and effects of recognition. 
This notion that the President's power to recognize for-
eign states carries with it a concommitant power to determine 
subsequent policy with respect to states so recognized was 
upheld in United States v. Pink,175 a case involving the valid-
112 Id. at 639. 
118 478 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1973). 
174 Henkin, FOREIGN Mums AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972). 
1711315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
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ity of the Litvinov Assignments.tTII In Pink, Justice Douglas 
speaking for the Court stated that: "The powers of the Pres-
ident in the conduct of foreign relations included the power, 
without consent of the Senate, to determine the public policy 
of the United States with respect to the Russian nationaliza-
tion decrees." 17'1 Justice Frankfurter's concurrence found it 
"indisputable" that "the President's control of foreign re-
lations includes the settlement of claims [and] . . . the power 
to establish nonnal relations with a foreign country. "tT8 
Given this precedent for the proposition that the President's 
power to communicate with and recognize foreign governments 
carries with it an allied power to determine the policy under-
lying such recognition, the executive may be viewed as having 
authority to determine what rights are to be accorded recog-
nized states by virtue of their status. Such discretion was 
implicit in the State Department's past practice of suggest-
ing or denying immunity. Moreover, in light of the fact that 
the executive is answerable to other states in diplomatic cor-
respondence, the power to issue suggestions of immunity has 
been a ,valuable and necessary prerogative. 
A further point should be noted here, the drafters and sup-
porters of the FSIA have consistently overlooked the fact 
. that U.S. municipal law cannot override U.S. obligations at 
international law. The prevailing view in international prac-
tice is that a domestic legislative directive does not provide 
an adequate answer to a foreign state's objection to acts and 
decisions of U.S. domestic courts. The implication being that 
U.S. legislation speaks only to municipal law and not to in-
ternational law except to the extent to which it is a precedent 
or ripens into state practice within the meaning of article 
38(1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
Thus, where executive a~tion is compelled by legislation and 
1711 The Assignment was in the form of a letter, dated November 16, 1933, to the 
President of the United States from Maxim Litvinov, People's Commissar for 
Foreign Aifairs. 
11'1315 U.s. at 229. 
1'18 III. at 240-241. 
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where a dispute over the legality of such action arises at interna-
tional law, the regularity of the domestic legislative process 
is irrelevant to any international law issues. The net result 
of all this is that the executive department is placed in a no-
win position or, in the language of sovereign immunity case-
law, is likely to be "embarrassed" in the conduct of foreign 
affairs. The underlying rationale for judicial deferrence in 
immunity cases had been precisely this, to avoid embarrassment 
to the Executive Branch. 
Additional support for exclusive executive authority in the 
realm of recognition of foreign states and in the policy judg-
ments surrounding suggestions of immunity is found in United 
States v. Curtiss-W righttT8 where Justice Sutherland quoted 
the now famous "sole organ" language of John Marshalp80 
in setting forth the contours of executive authority in the area 
of foreign relations: 
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing 
not alone with an authority vested in the President by an 
exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus 
the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the Presi-
dent as the sole organ of the federal government in the 
field of international relations - a power which 'does not 
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, . . . . 
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our inter-
national relations, embarrassment - perhaps serious embar-
rassment - is to be avoided and success for our aims 
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made ef-
fective through negotiation and inquiry within the inter-
national field must often accord to the President a degree 
of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which 
would not be admissable were domestic affairs alone in-
volved.181 
While there is considerable disagreement as to whether this 
sweep of power over foreign affairs is warranted by the in-
tent of the framers 182 the Supreme ·Court has viewed Curtiss-
118 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
1110 10 Annals of Congo 613 (1800) [1799-18011. 
181 299 U.S. at 320. 
182 Berger, The Presidential MOMpoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 
1,15-17, (1971). 
1977] SoVEBEIGN IMMUNITY 1178 
Wright as standing for the proposition that the executive has 
primary competence in the field of foreign relations.18S More 
recently in New York Times Co. v. United States,!8. where the 
Court refused to enjoin the publication of The Pentagon Papers 
on First Amendment grounds, there was ample support among 
the separate opinions for the view that the President is en-
dowed by the Constitution with primary responsibility in in-
ternational relations. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
Stewart stated in no uncertain terms that: 
In the governmental structure created by our Constitution, 
the Executive is endowed with enormous power in the two 
related areas of national defense and international relations. 
This power [is] largely unchecked by the Legislative and 
Judicial branches . • . .1811 
Judicial deference to the executive was made clear with re-
spect to suggestions of sovereign immunity. In Ea; Parte 
Peru,!" a case involving the detention of a Peruvian vessel 
libeled by an American plaintiff, the court stated: " ... Courts 
may not so exercise their jurisdiction, by the seizure and de-
tention ,of property of a friendly sovereign, as to embarrass 
the executive arm of the Government in conducting foreign 
relations.18T 
The recognition of the executive's role in determinations 
of when immunity is warranted was reiterated in a recent 
case before the Fifth Circuit. In 8pacil v. Orowe/88 a suit 
arising out of the arrest of a Cuban vessel engaged in essen-
tially commercial activity, the court applied the sole organ 
rationale to reach the conclusion that a suggestion of im-
munity by the State Department. was conclusive on the court. 
188 First Nat'l. City Bk. v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) 
Mr. Justice Rhenquist cited both Curtiss-Wright and United States v. Belmont, 
301 U_S. 324 (1937) with approval as "the exclusive competence of the Executive 
Branch in the :field of foreign atrairs" 406 U.S. at 766. 
184 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
1811 Id. at 727. 
186 318 U.S. 578 (1943). 
187 Id. at 730. 
188 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). 
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The court reasoned that it was required to take notice of 
executive directives in this area so as not "to interfere with 
or embarrass the executive in its constitutional role as the 
nation's primary organ of international policy." 189 It is clear 
that the sole organ theory has a continued vitality in cases 
where the courts are called upon to entertain suits which 
touch upon our foreign relations. Moreover, with regard to 
the executive's traditional role in determining a foreign state's 
immunity from suit, the State Department was exercising a 
function under its general power to recognize states and to 
determine what results flow from recognition. Thus, the FSIA, 
insofar as it cuts the State Department out of the decision-
making process attendant to claims of sovereign immunity, 
unnecessarily tampers with the separation of powers. Given 
that ours is a system of checks and balances and not a par-
liamentary democracy, such interference is of questionable wis-
dom. 
B. Oongress, the Executive and the Oourts: A Oonstitutional 
Triad 
It is beyond cavil that in most respects the Executive Branch 
exercises plenary power in the conduct of foreign relations.19O 
The Courts have recognized, without apparent unease, executive 
authority in the realm of foreign relations. The judiciary, while 
circumspect in passing upon issues having a direct impact upon 
foreign policy, has not, however, failed to take note of its re-
sponsibility within the Constitution. Even Justice Sutherland 
in Ourtiss-Wright191 felt compelled to advert to the role of the 
courts in deciding cases affecting. foreign affairs. While as-
serting that the President possessed "plenary and exclusive 
power" 192 in the field of international relations, Justice Suther-
land further stated that this power "like every other govern-
189 Id. at 620. 
190 Henkin, FOREIGN Arums AND THE CONSTITUTION, 94-97 (1972). 
1111299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
192 Id. at 320. 
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mental power, must be exercised in subordination to the appli-
cable provisions of the constitution." 198 
There can be no doubt but that while the Judicial Branch rec-
ognizes the paramount constitutional position of the executive 
in foreign relations, it is also quick to point out that the Execu-
tive must conduct foreign affairs within the acceptable limits of 
the Constitution as a whole. The holding in Youngstown Sheet 
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer 194 demonstrates the fact that even when 
the President is exercising war powers, his actions must pass con-
stitutional muster. In Youngstown Sheet and Tube, the court 
held that the seizure of the steel mills by President Truman in 
order to avert a strike during a time when U.S. military in-
tervention in Korea seemed imminent was unconstitutional.1915 
While recognizing general executive power under Article II, 
Justice Black, speaking for the court declared "we cannot with 
faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power 
as such to take possession of private property in order to keep 
labor disputes from stopping production." 198 The conclusion 
is inesc,pable, although the President may invoke constitution-
ally mandated powers under Article II, the exercise of those 
powers must conform to the dictates of the Constitution with 
. the reach of those powers being limited so as to fit the total con-
stitutional scheme of government. 
Where tension exists between the Judicial and Executive 
Branches as to the appropriate function of each, the judiciary, 
of course, reserves the right to resolve any disputes. Thus, in 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 197 the majority, though 
wishing to avoid "the possibility of conflict between the J udi-
cial and Executive Branches," 198 further stated that "it cannot 
of course be thought that every case or controversy which 
touches the foreign relations of our government is committed 
183 Id. 
194 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
1915 Id. at 585·588. 
198 Id. at 587. 
197 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
198 Id. at 483. 
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by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative Depart-
ments. "1111 The inferenee to be drawn from this and other cases 
in which the courts have been called upon to decide issues hav-
ing foreign policy implications is not so much that the judiciary 
is automatically compelled to abstain from adjudication on the 
merits, bnt that the 8:ets complained of violate no constitutional 
limits on the executive power. 
In cases involving sovereign immunity, there was a clear po-
tential for conflict between the Executive and Judicial Branches. 
On one hand, it is argued that sovereign immunity is a legal 
question appropriately dealt with by the courts, on the other 
hand, prior case law has amply demonstrated the willingness of 
the court to entertaiD executive suggestions of immunity. A 
desire to resolve this ctmfIict, apparent or real, was a chief 
motivation behind the FBIA. The drafters of the legislation 
resolved to leave sovereign immunity decisions exclusively to 
the courts, thereby discontinuing the practice of judicial defer-
ence to suggestions of immunity from the executive.200 In effect, 
Congress, at the urging of the Executive Branch, has intervened 
to settle an issue which exists between the Executive and Judi-
ciary. This raises the fundamental question of whether Con-
gress, in the exerci88 of its Article I powers can confer juris-
diction Oil Article In courts in an area which impacts upon a 
field traditionally viewed as being within the ambit of the Exec-
utive Branch's powers under Article n. Moreover, the Con-
gress has attempted to resolve the issue to the extent of fore-
closing the executive from any participation in the decision 
making process underlying grants of immunity to foreign states. 
It might be noted here that Congress once before attempted 
to resolve uncertainty which existed in the relationship be-
tween the executive and judicial branches. In the Hiekenlooper 
Amendment,181 Congress directed the courts to apply "ac-
cepted " principles of international law in cases involving ex-
propriations and the act of state doctrine. Congress discounted 
199 rd. at 423. 
lIOD H.B. 94-1487 p. 12. 
lI0121 U.S.C. I 2250 (1965). 
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the potential for conflict between executive and judiciary, a 
conflict which provided the rationale for Justice Harlan's opinion 
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.202 But one should 
hasten to add that even the Hickenlooper Amendment reserved 
in the President the power to determine to what extent act of 
state principles ought to apply.2GB However, there is no similar 
provision in the FSIA. 
The FSIA's congressional preemption of the power of the 
executive to issue suggestions of immunity could be met with 
considerable resistance by the federal (lourts. There are some 
precedents which suggest it is an unconstitutional invasion of 
the judicial function when Congress purports to bind the fed-
eral courts to decide a case in accordance with a rule of law 
independently unconstitutional on other grounds.204 The United 
States Supreme Court has once before rejected congressional 
attempts at imposing rules of decision upon Article III courts 
where such rules infringed upon the Executive's constitutional 
prerogatives. In United states v. Klein,20G a case involving the 
effect of a Presidential pardon in proceedings to recover prop-
erty co~scated by agents of the government during the Civil 
War, plaintiff won judgment in the Court of Claims for recovery 
of proceeds of sale of confiscated property. The judgment was 
based on legislation which accorded a right of recovery to cer-
tain noncombatant rebels upon proof of loyalty. Previously, the 
Supreme Court had held that loyalty required by the statute 
could be proved by a Presidential pardon. Pending appeal from 
the judgment by the United States, Congress passed an act pro-
viding that no pardon should be admissible as proof of loyalty. 
202 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
208 Hickenlooper Amendment 22 U.S.C. § 2250 sub. para. 620(e) (2). Professor 
Henkin has questioned the appropriateness of congressional intervention in luch 
cases. He has stated: "it does appear that when the Executive and the Judiciary 
are agreed, in a matter which involves their respective functions alld threatens to 
embroil their relations inter 8e, the Congress might at least afford them time and 
opportunity to prove their agreed doctrine, Henkins, FOREIGN AFI'AmS AND THE CON' 
STITUTION (1972). 
204 See Hart and Weschler, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 315-317 
(2d ed. 1973). 
2011 13 Wall 128 (U.S. 1872). 
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The statute further directed the Court of Claims and the 
Supreme Court to dismiss for want of jurisdiction any pending 
claims based on a pardon. 
The Court in Klein held that the supervening statute was un-
constitutional: 
The rule prescribed is also liable to just exception as im-
pairing the effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the 
constitutional power of the executive. 
It is the intention of the Constitution that each of the great 
co-ordinate departments of the government - the Legisla-
tive, the Executive, and the Judicial - shall be, in its 
sphere, independent of the others. To the executive alone 
is intrusted the power of pardon; and it is granted without 
limit. Pardon includes amnesty. It blots out the offense 
pardoned and removes all its penal consequences. It may be 
granted on conditions. In these particular pardons, that 
no doubt might exist as to their character, restoration of 
property was expressly pledged, and the pardon was granted 
on condition that the person who availed himself of it should 
take and keep a prescribed oath. 
Now it is clear that the legislature cannot change the ef-
fect of such a pardon any more than the executive can 
change a law. Yet this is attempted by the provision un-
der consideration.JOe 
Thus, the Supreme Court felt no compunctions about declaring 
void a statute which it found to infringe upon the constitutional 
power of the executive. If we assume that the Executive 
Branch's power to recognize foreign states and governments 
carries with it an attendant power to prescribe underlying poli-
cies like the immunity of such states from suit, then it is but a 
short step to concluding that the FSIA is an impermissible in-
fringement on those powers. 
While it can be argued that executive authority to issue sug-
gestions to sovereign immunity is not explicit in the same way 
as the power to pardon, the notion of separation of powers 
seems offended by the intrusion of Congress. The doctrine of 
separation of powers does, however, have a certain core beyond 
208111. at 147. Nor can Congress usurp the President's power to pardon criminal 
offenders. 866 Ex Parte Garland,4 Wall 833 (U.s. 1866) Ex Parte Grouman, 267 
U.s. 87 (19215). 
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which concurrent, departmental powers lapse into penumbra. 
Suffice it to say that where such penumbra exist evidence of the 
preeminence of a particular branch must be sought in prior 
practice and judicial decisions. At least one commentator has 
criticized the apparent intrusion into the realm of executive 
authority over the conduct of foreign policy brought about by 
the FSIA. Professor Myres McDougal has expressed doubts as 
to the validity of the FSIA insofar as the measure would ex-
clude the Executive Branch from immunity cases. Professor 
McDougal speaking during a meeting of the American Society 
of International Law stated that: 
... if our foreign affairs interests were prejudiced by a 
court taking jurisdiction of a case any rational President 
would suggest immunity and allY rational court would listen, 
despite the bill, because Congress cannot affect the Presi-
dent's inherent power over foreign affairs.207 
This conclusion is in no way altered by the fact that the De-
partments of State and Justice supported the legislation. What 
effect this self-denying ordinance will have on potential sepa-
ration of powers questions remains unclear. The court has, 
however, dealt with the issue of Executive Branch acquiescence 
in a derogation its own exclusive power. In Myers v. U.8.,208 
a case dealing with the power of Congress over appointment 
and removal of executive officers, the Court held that the Tenure 
of Office Act,209 which made removal of certain executive officers 
subject to congressional approval, was an unconstitutional usur-
pation of Presidential authority expressly conferred upon the 
executive by Article II.210 The Court further held that the ex-
ecutive branch's acquiescence in such curtailment of its own 
power was irrelevant and did not cure the taint of unconstitu-
tionality. 
A more recent case, Zschernig v. Miller,211 involved the same 
issue of Executive Branch acquiesence in the usurpation of an 
:t071976 Paoo. OF THE AM. Soo. OF INT'L. L. 57. 
208 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
:t0914 Stat. 487, c. 170 § 2. 
:tlO 272 U.S. at 164-5. 
211389 U.S. 429 (1968) at p. 
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exclusive executive power, this time by a state. In that case, the 
courts of Oregon, applying a state statute, had denied an inherit-
ance of personalty to a resident of East Germany because he 
could not establish that he would enjoy the inheritance without 
confiscation by the East German government. The Solicitor Gen-
eral of the United States had informed the court that the State 
Department had no objections to the holding as it would have 
little or no effect on foreign affairs. The concurring opinion 
of Justices IStewart and Brennan discounted the fact that the 
State Department was willing to adhere to the judgment of a 
state court in the field of foreign relations: 
Our system of govemment is such that the interest of the 
cities, counties, and states, no less than the interest of the 
people of the whole nation, imperatively requires that fed-
eral power in the field affecting foreign relations be left 
entirely free from local interference. 
The Solicitor General, as amicws curiae, says that the Gov-
ernment does not "contend that the application of the Ore-
gon escheat statute in the circumstances of this case unduly 
interfere with the United States' conduct of foreign rela-
tions. " But that is not the point. We deal here with the 
basic allocation of power between the States and the Nation. 
Resolution of so fundamental a constitutional issue cannot 
vary from day to day with the shifting winds at the State 
Department.111 
The implication is clear; no amount of executive self-denial 
will overcome an impermissible exercise of authority or in-
fringement on the ordering of our constitutional system. 
The FSIA presents several potential constitutional problems. 
It infringes upon areas traditionally viewed as within the ex-
clusive province of the Executive Branch. Furthermore it 
comes at a time when the courts are beginning to carve out for 
themselves workable contours of restrictive immunity. Ironi-
cally the FSIA, while purporting to give the courts sole author-
ity to pass on the validity of immunity claims, actually directs 
their decisions. This is particularly true with respect to the 
211Id. at 442-443. 
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provision of section 1605 which directs courts to deny immunity 
where property taken in violation of international law is present 
within a court's jurisdiction. However, it is the Congress's own 
particular view of what international law requires, rather than 
an independent judicial determination which is mandated by the 
FSIA. At the very least, the legislation amounts to an unneces-
sary tampering with the appropriate alignment of powers under 
the Constitution, an alignment which up until now has operated 
with remarkable efficiency. 
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